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Fri, 20 Nov 2026 17:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Tapo provides Rust and Python APIs and an MCP server for TP-Link Tapo smart devices. From 0.3.1 until 0.5.0, the Streamable HTTP implementation in tapo-mcp/src/server.rs calls disable_allowed_hosts() without replacement Host or Origin validation, while TAPO_MCP_API_KEY remains optional for a listener that can bind to all interfaces. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to send same-origin browser requests to the victim's local or LAN Tapo MCP listener when it runs without an API key. The attacker can invoke exposed tools including control_device for smart-device actuation and take_snapshot for configured cameras. Deployments with TAPO_MCP_API_KEY set are not affected by the unauthenticated path, and exploitation requires a running listener configured with real Tapo credentials and devices, plus victim interaction with the malicious site. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.0. | |
| Title | Tapo: DNS rebinding reaches unauthenticated Tapo MCP smart-home controls | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-346 CWE-350 |
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cvssV4_0
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-20T16:57:40.772Z
Reserved: 2026-08-20T19:24:11.618Z
Link: CVE-2026-77329
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Status : Received
Published: 2026-11-20T17:18:26.917
Modified: 2026-11-20T17:18:26.917
Link: CVE-2026-77329
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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