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CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2026-133190 1 Misp 1 Misp 2026-11-19 3.7 Low
MISP, a threat intelligence sharing platform, contains a vulnerability in its cryptographic key management for protected (PGP-signed) events. Two related defects allow a revoked PGP key to remain effective for signing and validating protected events. First, the validateProtectedEvent() method in the CryptographicKey model iterates over the event's stored cryptographic keys to verify a PGP signature but does not check the revoked flag on each key. A key explicitly marked as revoked is still used to validate signatures, meaning an entity whose key has been revoked can continue to sign protected events and have them accepted by the MISP instance. Second, the captureCryptographicKeyUpdate() method, responsible for synchronizing the key list when a sync user edits a protected event, contained a query bug (find('first') instead of find('all')) that caused only the first stored key to be considered. As a result, revocations of additional keys were never persisted, keys absent from the pushed list were not removed, and entries lacking an explicit fingerprint were mismatched and incorrectly deleted. Additionally, the revocation logic did not enforce the invariant that a revocation, once stored, is never lifted by subsequent pushes. A third minor issue: a signed protected event submitted without any cryptographic keys triggered an unhandled 500 error rather than a proper rejection response. Preconditions: the attacker must be an authenticated sync user with permission to add or edit protected events on the MISP instance. The impact is that revoked keys retain signing authority, key revocations propagated by sync partners are silently dropped, and the integrity of the protected-event trust chain is compromised. In a multi-instance MISP deployment, events signed by revoked keys can propagate to other instances, extending the integrity impact across the sync network.
CVE-2026-133197 2026-11-19 5 Medium
In JetBrains Junie CLI before 26.9.22 command injection was possible via file names in code review
CVE-2026-133196 2026-11-19 5.3 Medium
In JetBrains Junie CLI before 26.11.1 files outside the project could be overwritten via shell output redirection
CVE-2026-133195 2026-11-19 7.5 High
In JetBrains Junie CLI before 26.6.29 files outside the project directory could be modified by agent file tools
CVE-2026-133194 2026-11-19 5.6 Medium
In JetBrains Junie GitHub Action before 1.10.0 command injection was possible via the action version input
CVE-2026-133193 2026-11-19 5.6 Medium
In JetBrains Junie GitHub Action before 1.10.0 code execution was possible via path traversal in feedback session markers
CVE-2026-133192 2026-11-19 4.2 Medium
In JetBrains Junie GitHub Action before 1.10.0 untrusted fork code could be processed in privileged workflow runs
CVE-2026-120753 2026-11-19 N/A
In Eclipse Ditto versions 1.1.0 to 3.9.8, when pre-authentication is enabled, the gateway service accepts the pre-authenticated subject not only from the `x-ditto-pre-authenticated` HTTP header set by a trusted reverse proxy, but also from an undocumented `x-ditto-pre-authenticated` URL query parameter that a client can set. A reverse proxy that only overwrites the header therefore does not stop clients from supplying their own subject. With the default configuration of the Ditto Helm chart (`global.jwtOnly: false`, which implicitly enables pre-authentication), the bundled nginx skips HTTP Basic authentication for any request with an `Authorization: Bearer` header and forwards it without the pre-authentication header. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send an invalid Bearer token together with the query parameter to authenticate as any chosen policy subject. Pre-authentication succeeds before the JWT is validated, so the attacker can read and modify Things and Policies with that subject's permissions. As a mitigation, disable pre-authentication in the gateway (`ENABLE_PRE_AUTHENTICATION=false`) or, when using the Helm chart, configure `global.jwtOnly: true`.
CVE-2026-101686 1 Oracle 2 E-business Suite, E-business Suite Integrated Soa Gateway 2026-11-19 8.8 High
Vulnerability in the Oracle E-Business Suite Integrated SOA Gateway product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: SOA Provider). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle E-Business Suite Integrated SOA Gateway. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle E-Business Suite Integrated SOA Gateway. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
CVE-2026-99565 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: wait for negotiation before receiving another PDU The receive thread queues a request and can read the next PDU before the negotiation worker finishes. While need_neg is set, the next PDU can cause ksmbd_init_smb_server() to replace conn->ops. A pipelined SMB2 request can therefore make the worker handle an earlier, shorter SMB1 request with SMB2 operations and read beyond its buffer. An SMB1 multi-protocol negotiate may be followed by an SMB2 NEGOTIATE that changes conn->ops again. Wait for work queued while the connection is new or needs negotiation to complete before reading another PDU. This keeps the operations stable for both stages of negotiation without changing when need_neg is cleared.
CVE-2026-99564 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: smbdirect: don't wait for RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED in smbdirect_socket_destroy_sync() smbdirect_socket_destroy_sync() waited for RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED after smbdirect_socket_cleanup_work() called rdma_disconnect(). That can take very long, e.g. if the peer just disappeared, until the rdma cm gives up, or forever if the event already happened, but the status was overwritten afterwards. This is not needed: smbdirect_socket_destroy() drains the qp under rdma_lock_handler(), destroys it and calls rdma_destroy_id(), which only waits for a currently running event handler and makes sure no further events are delivered. The rest of the disconnect protocol (DREQ/DREP and timewait for IB, abrupt close for iWarp) is handled by the rdma core asynchronously. drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c also just calls rdma_disconnect() and ib_drain_qp() before rdma_destroy_id(). So smbdirect_socket_destroy() now also accepts SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_DISCONNECTING and changes the status to SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_DISCONNECTED itself under rdma_lock_handler(). We could still get RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED in the small windows between rdma_unlock_handler() and rdma_destroy_id(), but in that case smbdirect_connection_rdma_event_handler() is basically a no-op.
CVE-2026-99563 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener A child of a listener only left the listen.pending or listen.ready list via smbdirect_socket_accept() or when the listener was destroyed. So every connection that failed before it was accepted (negotiate timeout, peer disconnect, invalid negotiate request, ...) stayed on the list and counted against the backlog until the listener was destroyed. After about backlog (10 for ksmbd) such connections smbdirect_listen_connect_request() rejected every new connection with -EBUSY, so an unauthenticated peer was able to permanently stop ksmbd from accepting SMB-Direct connections. Now a failed child moves itself to a new listen.orphaned list at the end of smbdirect_socket_cleanup_work(), after the disconnect was started, and queues listen.purge_orphaned_work, which releases it with smbdirect_socket_release(), without holding the listener's rdma_lock_handler() lock, in the same way smbdirect_socket_destroy() does for the remaining children. Orphaned sockets still count against the backlog until they are released. sc->accept.listener is now only changed under listener->listen.lock and whoever clears it is responsible for releasing the socket: smbdirect_socket_accept(), purge_orphaned_work or the destroy of the listener. In order to make that work: - a struct smbdirect_socket that is a listener is now freed via kfree_rcu(), so that a child can dereference sc->accept.listener under rcu_read_lock(), even if the listener is released concurrently. - smbdirect_listen_connect_request() adds nsc to the listen.pending list and sets nsc->accept.listener before it calls smbdirect_accept_connect_request(), and always returns 0 so the rdma_cm core keeps the connection id and nsc owns it. On a non-zero return it schedules nsc's teardown with smbdirect_socket_schedule_cleanup(), which orphans it off the listener so that purge_orphaned_work releases it; nsc destroys its own connection id with rdma_destroy_id() in that teardown. The teardown has to be deferred because the rdma_cm core holds nsc's id_priv->handler_mutex across the handler, so nsc->rdma.cm_id must not be destroyed synchronously from here. That same handler_mutex (and the listener's) also guarantees nsc can't go away under us, so setting the listener before the call is safe and lets a failure orphan nsc. - smbdirect_accept_negotiate_recv_work() no longer moves a socket to the ready list if it already failed or no longer belongs to the listener. Every accepting socket has a listener, so if sc->accept.listener is already cleared, it no longer sends a negotiate response, as the socket is about to be released. - smbdirect_socket_destroy() of the listener disables purge_orphaned_work and also releases the orphaned sockets.
CVE-2026-99562 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: reject FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA on a directory handle An authenticated client with a writable tree connection can open a directory with FILE_WRITE_DATA and send FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA on that handle. The handler only checks fp->daccess & FILE_WRITE_DATA_LE, but on a directory FILE_WRITE_DATA is the legitimate add-file right, so the check passes. ksmbd_vfs_zero_data() then calls kernel_write() on the directory file, which has no FMODE_WRITE, and __kernel_write_iter() hits WARN_ON_ONCE(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)), panicking a panic_on_warn kernel. Before commit 25e414db7033 ("ksmbd: report holes in allocated range queries") the dense-file path used vfs_fallocate(), which rejects directories with -EISDIR. The kernel_write() loop that replaced it has no such check. Reject a directory handle in ksmbd_vfs_zero_data() before writing, as ksmbd_vfs_write() already does for SMB2_WRITE. WARNING: fs/read_write.c:608 at __kernel_write_iter+0x74b/0x8c0 Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work Call Trace: kernel_write+0x1ef/0x4d0 ksmbd_vfs_zero_data+0x413/0x590 smb2_ioctl+0x21fa/0x66a0 handle_ksmbd_work+0x61b/0x1ff0
CVE-2026-99561 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fork: don't create io threads once PF_POSTCOREDUMP is set zap_process() skips every thread that already has PF_POSTCOREDUMP set. Such a thread is past synchronize_group_exit(), so a coredump can't catch it anymore. It isn't counted in core_state->threads_remaining and it isn't sent SIGKILL. do_exit() sets PF_POSTCOREDUMP in synchronize_group_exit() and calls io_uring_files_cancel() right after that. The cancellation runs task work and a create_worker_cb() that io-wq queued before the exit creates a new io-wq worker from there. If another thread started a coredump in the meantime that worker joins a thread-group which is already being dumped. zap_process() never saw it so it was never counted. But when it exits it sees signal->core_state in synchronize_group_exit() and decrements threads_remaining like any other thread. So the count reaches zero one thread early and the dumper leaves coredump_wait_inactive() while a thread it counted is still running. The task has no fatal signal pending because zap_process() deliberately didn't send it one, and it never went through get_signal() so it doesn't have PF_SIGNALED either. Refuse to create an io thread when the creator has PF_POSTCOREDUMP. That costs nothing. io_uring_files_cancel() raises IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT before it runs any task work, so a worker created from there only ever gets to exit again, and io_should_retry_thread() doesn't retry -EINTR. Clearing PF_POSTCOREDUMP for the new thread in copy_process() was the other option. It makes the worker a thread like any other, but it only helps while the dump hasn't started. A worker born after zap_process() has run is invisible to it whatever its flags say and still decrements threads_remaining on the way out. Refusing to create it covers both, and then no task is ever born with the flag, so there is nothing to clear. Moving io_uring_files_cancel() ahead of synchronize_group_exit() closes the same window. It runs the cancellation, and whatever that can block on, before the thread announces itself to the dumper. A thread that blocks there never reaches coredump_task_exit() at all, so the dumper ends up waiting for a thread that never parks. Refusing the creation leaves the cancellation where it is. But it's very ugly to run io_uring work even before we did all the generic exit work.
CVE-2026-99560 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7925: fix reset panic caused by the WM2 rx irq mask mt7925_irq_map sets wm2_complete_mask, but mt7925_dma_layout has no tx done ring, so the MT_RXQ_MCU_WA queue and its NAPI are never set up. On a chip reset, mt7925e_mac_reset() calls napi_disable() on that NAPI and crashes: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000a40 Workqueue: mt76 mt7925_mac_reset_work [mt7925_common] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x1c/0x50 Call Trace: napi_disable+0x1d/0x50 mt7925e_mac_reset+0x327/0x420 [mt7925e] mt7925_mac_reset_work+0x9a/0x1a0 [mt7925_common] Remove the WM2 mask from mt7925_irq_map and from MT7925_INT_RX_DONE_ALL.
CVE-2026-99559 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ARM: 9524/1: mm: align hugetlb mappings to the huge page size mmap(MAP_HUGETLB) on 32-bit Arm can return an address which is not aligned to the huge page size. In a QEMU virt guest, unmapping the VMA then hits the alignment check in __unmap_hugepage_range(): kernel BUG at mm/hugetlb.c:5213! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ARM PC is at __unmap_hugepage_range+0x540/0x584 LR is at __zap_vma_range+0x13a0/0x1410 Commit 7bd3f1e1a9ae ("mm: make hugetlb mappings go through mm_get_unmapped_area_vmflags") made hugetlb mappings use the architecture's arch_get_unmapped_area(). The generic implementations handle hugetlb alignment, but the Arm implementations only account for the optional SHMLBA cache-colouring constraint. A 4 KiB-page kernel can therefore align the mapping to 4 KiB or 16 KiB instead of the required 2 MiB. Set the alignment mask from the file's hstate for hugetlb mappings in both Arm implementations. Huge-page alignment also satisfies the SHMLBA constraint.
CVE-2026-99558 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-crypto: fix NULL deref and UAF in __blk_crypto_evict_key() Sashiko reported a possible NULL pointer dereference, triggered by the following flow: dm-inlinecrypt ctor # first use of the fallback ├─ blk_crypto_init_key() # succeeds, ctx->key.size != 0 ├─ blk_crypto_start_using_key() │ ├─ hw-wrapped key: -EOPNOTSUPP │ │ # profile never allocated (NULL) │ └─ raw key: fallback_start_using_mode() │ └─ blk_crypto_fallback_init() fails │ └─ kfree(profile) # not NULLed ├─ goto bad └─ inlinecrypt_dtr() # evicts whenever key.size is set └─ blk_crypto_evict_key() └─ blk_crypto_config_supported_natively() = false └─ blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key() └─ __blk_crypto_evict_key(blk_crypto_fallback_profile) └─ profile->num_slots # BOOM!!! This issue can be reproduced using the following commands: dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/backing bs=1M count=64 LOOP=$(losetup -f --show /tmp/backing) SZ=$(blockdev --getsz $LOOP) KEY=$(head -c 64 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n') dmsetup create ic --table "0 $SZ inlinecrypt aes-xts-plain64 \ $KEY 0 $LOOP 0 1 keytype:hw-wrapped" And the following oops is triggered: ================================================================== blk-crypto: loop0: no support for wrapped keys Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000b: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000058-0x000000000000005f] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 901 Comm: dmsetup 7.3.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) RIP: 0010:__blk_crypto_evict_key+0x2e/0x3b0 Call Trace: blk_crypto_evict_key+0x24c/0x320 inlinecrypt_dtr+0xf6/0x160 inlinecrypt_ctr+0x2d3/0xbd0 dm_table_add_target+0x661/0xf40 table_load+0x1c4/0x490 ctl_ioctl+0x32f/0x5f0 dm_ctl_ioctl+0xe/0x20 ================================================================== dm-inlinecrypt is the only caller that can evict a key that was never started, as fscrypt frees such a key without evicting it. Fix this by returning early from blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key() when tfms_inited[] is not set for the key's mode. tfms_inited[] is only set after blk_crypto_fallback_init() has successfully initialized the profile, so the crash above is no longer reachable. The bug has been latent since commit c984ff1423ae ("blk-crypto: dynamically allocate fallback profile") was merged in v6.5, and only became actually triggerable when commit e7f57d2c47e2 ("dm-inlinecrypt: add target for inline block device encryption") was merged in v7.2.
CVE-2026-99557 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fail readdir when the MDS reply carries no dirfrag A ceph mount oopses in ceph_readdir() when the MDS answers a READDIR request with a reply whose extra blob is empty. parse_reply_info() skips reply blobs whose length is zero, so parse_reply_info_readdir() never runs, r_reply_info.dir_dir stays NULL, and the reply still parses as successful. ceph_mdsc_do_request() returns 0 and ceph_readdir() then reads rinfo->dir_dir->frag with no NULL check: /* extra */ ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, len, bad); if (len > 0) { ... err = parse_reply_info_extra(&p, p + len, req, features, s); ... } The oops on v7.3.0-rc4-00537-ga3ff15db6820, one getdents64(2) on the mount root after an ms_mode=legacy mount, trimmed: BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 266 Comm: ls Tainted: G N 7.3.0-rc4-00537-ga3ff15db6820 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) RIP: 0010:ceph_readdir+0xbff/0x3ea0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __pfx_ceph_readdir+0x10/0x10 wrap_directory_iterator+0xa2/0xe0 iterate_dir+0x1da/0x5d0 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x13b/0x2a0 do_syscall_64+0xdd/0x4a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> The unconditional frag read came in with 81c6aea5275ea ("ceph: handle frag mismatch between readdir request and reply"), so the bug is old. Treat a reply with no dirfrag as a protocol violation: warn once, drop the request and return -EIO, the same way ceph_readdir() already handles the two malformed-reply cases later in the function. Tested on v7.3.0-rc4-00537-ga3ff15db6820 (KASAN). Unpatched, the getdents64(2) above takes the machine down (oops=panic) on the first READDIR reply. With the patch it warns once and getdents64(2) returns -EIO, no oops, no hang. A conformant reply for an empty directory — dirfrag present, zero entries, FRAG_END|FRAG_COMPLETE — still lists "." and ".." and returns EOF on both kernels, so normal readdir behavior is unchanged. The oops is still present in v7.3-rc5 (72d3fcf802c45).
CVE-2026-99556 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: serialize directory emptiness checks with readdir SMB2 QUERY_DIRECTORY holds fp->readdir_lock while it calls iterate_dir() on fp->filp. An SMB2 SET_INFO request with FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION can resolve the same FileId and call ksmbd_vfs_empty_dir() on the same filp without that lock. iterate_dir()'s inode read lock permits concurrent readers and does not serialize per-file iterator state. ext4 stores its dx readdir cursor and fname RB tree in file->private_data. Concurrent reset or refill can therefore free a fname node while the other worker still traverses it or retains its RB-tree link, resulting in use-after-free accesses. An authenticated SMB client with list and delete rights on a directory in a writable KSMBD share backed by ext4 can trigger this when the directory takes the dx readdir path. The client overlaps an SMB2 QUERY_DIRECTORY request with an SMB2 SET_INFO request carrying FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION on one live FileId. In one x86_64 SMP KASAN multi-shot guest using ksmbd-for-next at 171df27077fb, the unmodified kernel reported a cross-worker use-after-free before a panic. The first report's access and free stacks show the two request paths directly (trimmed): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x488/0x550 Read of size 8 by task kworker/2:0/29 Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work Call Trace: ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x488/0x550 htree_dirblock_to_tree+0x535/0x990 ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x319/0xba0 ext4_readdir+0x175a/0x2f40 iterate_dir+0x1b6/0x630 smb2_query_dir+0x1003/0x1cc0 Freed by task 279: free_rb_tree_fname+0x67/0xc0 ext4_readdir+0x13a9/0x2f40 iterate_dir+0x1b6/0x630 ksmbd_vfs_empty_dir+0xa2/0x100 smb2_set_info+0x2ffa/0x45d0 Take fp->readdir_lock across the entire emptiness check. This places both iterators over that handle's filp in the same lock domain while preserving the disposition status handling. The exact code change completed a warning-free x86_64 KASAN bzImage build. Tracing three request pairs showed that the two iterate_dir() calls no longer overlapped and the expected statuses were preserved. A further 1,600 reproducer iterations completed with expected statuses and no KASAN report, Oops, or panic. The reproducer and complete guest configuration are available privately to maintainers on request.
CVE-2026-99555 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: usbtv: fix null-pointer dereference on disconnect A null-pointer dereference can occur in usb_make_path() when called from usbtv_querycap() (and other ioctl handlers) during device disconnection. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000a: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000050-0x0000000000000057] RIP: 0010:usb_make_path include/linux/usb.h:985 [inline] RIP: 0010:usbtv_querycap+0x9c/0x100 drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-video.c:612 ... Call Trace: <TASK> v4l_querycap+0x236/0x470 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:1106 __video_do_ioctl+0x8af/0xc70 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:3133 video_usercopy+0x860/0x1430 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:3475 v4l2_ioctl+0x18d/0x1e0 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-dev.c:366 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 This happens due to a race condition between the USB device disconnect routine (usbtv_disconnect()) and V4L2 ioctls. When the device is disconnected, usbtv_disconnect() sets usbtv->udev = NULL without holding the usbtv->v4l2_lock mutex. Concurrently, an ioctl handler like usbtv_querycap() can be executing under the v4l2_lock and attempt to use usbtv->udev, leading to a crash. To fix this, move the usbtv->udev = NULL assignment into usbtv_video_free() and protect it with mutex_lock(&usbtv->v4l2_lock). This ensures that no non-queue ioctl handler can run concurrently with the pointer being nullified. If an ioctl is already running, the mutex will block the disconnect path until the ioctl finishes. If an ioctl is blocked waiting for the lock, it will acquire it after the disconnect routine releases it, but will then check video_is_registered() (which was cleared by vb2_video_unregister_device()) and safely return -ENODEV. Acquiring v4l2_lock after vb2_video_unregister_device() avoids reintroducing a historical deadlock issue, and usbtv_audio_free() remains safe as it is called before usbtv_video_free().