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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-47576 | 1 Nvidia | 5 Geforce, Nvs, Quadro and 2 more | 2026-09-30 | 7.7 High |
| NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows contains a vulnerability in the kernel module through which an attacker might initiate an out-of-bounds read. Successful exploitation of this issue could lead to denial of service and information disclosure. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47592 | 1 Nvidia | 8 Geforce, Guest Driver, Nvs and 5 more | 2026-09-30 | 7.8 High |
| NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows and Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where an unprivileged user could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47593 | 1 Nvidia | 6 Geforce, Guest Driver, Nvs and 3 more | 2026-09-30 | 7.8 High |
| NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where an unprivileged user can cause an out-of-bounds write. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, and denial of service. | ||||
| CVE-2026-83596 | 1 Redhat | 1 Enterprise Linux | 2026-09-30 | 8.8 High |
| A flaw was found in WebKitGTK. Processing malicious web content can cause memory corruption due to improper memory handling. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47545 | 1 Nvidia | 6 Geforce, Nvs, Quadro and 3 more | 2026-09-30 | 7.8 High |
| NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows and Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where an attacker could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97059 | 1 Offis | 1 Dcmtk | 2026-09-30 | 8.2 High |
| DCMTK through 3.7.0 contains a heap over-read vulnerability in ConcatenationLoader that copies pixel data frames without validating the PixelData buffer length against the declared NumberOfFrames. Attackers can craft malicious DICOM instances declaring more frames than the buffer contains to trigger heap over-reads that crash the application or leak adjacent heap memory. | ||||
| CVE-2026-76723 | 1 Hewlett Packard Enterprise (hpe) | 1 Instant On | 2026-09-30 | 9.6 Critical |
| Buffer overflow vulnerabilities exist in the affected interface of HPE Networking Instant ON APS that could allow an unauthenticated adjacent attacker to achieve remote code execution. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102820 | 2 Eugeny, Rust | 2 Russh, Pageant | 2026-09-30 | 6.2 Medium |
| pageant provides a [PageantStream] type that implements [AsyncRead] and [AsyncWrite] traits and can be used to talk to a running Pageant instance. Prior to pageant 0.2.3, the Windows pageant crate's pageant/src/wmmessage.rs MemoryMap::read function trusts a peer-controlled u32 response length supplied through the 8192-byte Pageant shared-memory mapping reached by AgentClient::connect_pageant. A local process that impersonates the Pageant window can make query_pageant_direct allocate up to approximately 4 GiB and copy beyond the mapped view, reliably crashing a russh client and conditionally exposing adjacent committed memory. This issue is fixed in pageant 0.2.3. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102758 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Netx Duo | 2026-09-30 | 7.5 High |
| The `_nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse()` function parses ASN.1 TLV (tag-length-value) blocks out of DER-encoded data. It is the primitive underneath all X.509 certificate parsing in NetX Secure, and therefore runs on certificates supplied by a remote peer during the TLS handshake. The function reads the one-byte ASN.1 tag from the caller's buffer *before* checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. When a caller passes a remaining length of zero, the guard correctly returns `NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG`, but the read has already happened one byte past the end of the buffer. code: nx_secure/src/nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse.c ``` UINT _nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse(const UCHAR *buffer, ULONG *buffer_length, USHORT *tlv_type, USHORT *tlv_tag_class, ULONG *tlv_length, const UCHAR **tlv_data, ULONG *header_length) { UINT current_index; USHORT current_tag; ULONG length; ULONG length_bytes; current_index = 0; current_tag = buffer[current_index]; /* <-- read before the bounds check */ if (*buffer_length < 1) { return(NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); } ``` The remainder of the function is correctly ordered. The multi-byte length path is guarded by `length_bytes > 4 || length_bytes > *buffer_length` before its read loop, the decoded value is checked against `length > *buffer_length`, and the second single-byte length read follows its own `*buffer_length < 1` guard. The tag read is the only load placed ahead of its check. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102521 | 1 Dmonad | 1 Lib0 | 2026-09-30 | 8.6 High |
| The decoder in `readFromDataView` in lib0 before 0.2.119 can be tricked into reading more than it should from a buffer. The vulnerability allows reading past the decoders' view, thus exposing adjacent process memory. This can be anything that is currently in the head, for example credentials or logs. This is similar to but different from GHSA-r5c8-rf4w-qrq8. | ||||
| CVE-2026-69276 | 1 Microsoft | 20 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 17 more | 2026-09-30 | 9.8 Critical |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Microsoft UxTheme Library (uxtheme.dll) allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-69277 | 1 Microsoft | 26 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 23 more | 2026-09-30 | 7.8 High |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Local Security Authority Server (lsasrv) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102360 | 1 Dmonad | 1 Lib0 | 2026-09-30 | 8.6 High |
| A missing bounds check in the binary decoder in lib0, versions 0.2.1-0.2.117 and earlier and 1.0.0-rc.32 and earlier, lets any unauthenticated remote peer read adjacent process memory and receive it back. `readUint8Array` never compares the wire-supplied length against the decoder's own view, so one over-long length prefix returns whatever the host process allocated next: other tenants' document content, personal data, and live bearer session tokens**, recovered in full and at will. An attacker who can supply bytes to a lib0 decoder which means any peer that can open a socket, including before authentication reads adjacent process memory and, where the consumer echoes, stores or re-serves the decoded value, receives it back. This is patched in version 0.2.118 and 1.0.0-rc.33. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102567 | 1 Opennmt | 1 Ctranslate2 | 2026-09-30 | 6.1 Medium |
| CTranslate2 before 4.8.1 contains an out-of-bounds heap read vulnerability in the binary model loader when deserializing string fields without null terminators. Attackers can craft malicious model files to trigger heap memory reads past buffer boundaries, causing crashes or disclosing adjacent heap memory contents. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102711 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx/threadx | 2026-09-30 | N/A |
| Two issues in the ThreadX loadable-module loader, reached when a device loads an attacker-controlled module object via `_txm_module_manager_memory_load` / `_txm_module_manager_in_place_load` — APIs that take ONLY a base pointer, no image length, so every size/offset field in `TXM_MODULE_PREAMBLE` is fully attacker-trusted: (1) a heap OOB **read** (`code_size` trusted as the source-image length in the code-copy loop), and (2) a control-flow-integrity / defense-in-depth gap (module entry/start/callback/stop pointers computed as `code_start + preamble_offset` with only a `!= 0` check, and the preamble `checksum` never verified). No controlled OOB write was found (honest — the copy destination is overflow-guarded). | ||||
| CVE-2026-102712 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Netx Duo | 2026-09-30 | N/A |
| On the first DTLS ClientHello, the parser copies a device-claimed session_id length and validates the ciphersuite-list length against the total record length instead of the remaining bytes. An unauthenticated peer drives an OOB source read of up to 255 bytes, and those bytes are echoed verbatim into the outgoing ServerHello, disclosing adjacent process memory over the network. The crash variant fires on the first packet. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102713 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Netx Duo | 2026-09-30 | N/A |
| The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than four bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not against the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one missing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none. The handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX: ```c /* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */ status = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, &temp_ptr, server_ptr -> nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER); ... fx_file_write(&(client_request_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_request_file), packet_ptr -> nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4, packet_ptr -> nx_packet_length - 4); ``` `nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the end of the first packet: ``` ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5 #0 __interceptor_memcpy #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78 0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region ``` Those bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them back, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel. The same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs ceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the attacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never returns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and the server thread suspended, and no later client is served. Reject `nx_packet_length > 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call, and use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102714 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Netx Duo | 2026-09-30 | N/A |
| `_nx_icmpv6_validate_options()` scans the option area with `while (length > 2)` (`common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79`). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is not negative, so the function returns `NX_SUCCESS`. Its zero-length rejection never sees those bytes. Every consumer then re-walks the same area, reading a two-byte option header at the residue and subtracting `nx_icmpv6_option_length << 3` with no zero check and no remaining-length check. Three outcomes follow, selected by bytes the attacker controls. **Zero length byte.** The walker subtracts zero and advances zero. All four handlers loop forever — `_nx_icmpv6_process_ra` (`nx_icmpv6_process_ra.c:245, :528`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_ns` (`:251, :329`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_na` (`:147, :156`) and `_nx_icmpv6_process_redirect` (`:247, :350`). The walk runs in the IP thread, which is the highest-priority thread and does not yield inside the loop, so the system stops until a watchdog reset and the frame can be replayed after each one. **Non-zero length byte on a short residue.** The three unsigned counters underflow — `2 - 8` becomes `0xFFFFFFFA` — and the walk continues past the packet buffer, reading until it faults or meets a zero length byte and freezes. The Router Advertisement counter is signed and exits cleanly in this case. **One-byte residue.** The walker reads a two-byte option header, over-reading one byte. During a runaway walk, stray bytes parsing as a link-layer address option are copied into the neighbor cache (`nx_icmpv6_process_ns.c:280, :293`) and subsequently used as the destination MAC for frames to that neighbour, placing off-packet memory on the link. Confirmed by inspection, not reproduced. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102718 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Netx Duo | 2026-09-30 | N/A |
| hey, `_nx_snmp_utility_object_id_get` in the NetX Duo SNMP addon does not validate the claimed OID data length against the actual buffer size when the OID uses BER multibyte length encoding, so a remote attacker can send a crafted SNMP packet with a multibyte OID length larger than the available buffer, causing the parser to read past the packet buffer boundary into adjacent heap memory. the OOB bytes are decoded as OID component values and written into the agents internal OID string buffer, corrupting agent state. on systems with memory protection the OOB read poses the risk of crashing the SNMP agent thread, causing denial of service. on bare metal embedded systems without memory protection the read silently succeeds and corrupts the agents internal state with heap data. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102721 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Netx Duo | 2026-09-30 | N/A |
| A TFTP server that answers with a short ERROR packet makes the client read up to 64 bytes past the received datagram. Each receive path checks only that the datagram is at least four bytes long (nxd_tftp_client.c:1229, 1521, 1984). When the opcode is NX_TFTP_CODE_ERROR the message string is copied with a loop whose only limits are the destination buffer and a NUL byte: ```c /* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_client.c:1769 */ for (i = 0; (i < (sizeof(tftp_client_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_error_string) - 1)) && (*buffer_ptr); i++) ``` Nothing compares `buffer_ptr` against `nx_packet_append_ptr`. An ERROR packet that carries no terminating NUL, which a server controls completely, walks the loop off the end of the packet until it happens to meet a zero byte or fills the 64 byte destination. ``` ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 1 at 0x60d0000000c8 thread T4 #0 _nxd_tftp_client_file_read addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_client.c:1769 0x60d0000000c8 is 0 bytes to the right of 136-byte region ``` The open path has the same loop at :1327 and reports the same way. What is read lands in `nx_tftp_client_error_string`, which the application is expected to display or log, so adjacent packet pool memory ends up in whatever the device does with the error text. Add `(buffer_ptr < packet_ptr -> nx_packet_append_ptr)` to the loop condition in all three paths. | ||||