| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Netatalk is a Free and Open Source file server suite for Unix-like operating systems. From 1.5.0 until 4.5.1, dsi_stream_receive in libatalk/dsi/dsi_stream.c independently clamps dsi_doff and dsi_len for DSIWrite requests without enforcing that the data offset is no greater than the declared frame length. An authenticated AFP client can send dsi_doff greater than dsi_len, causing the receiver to consume bytes from a queued subsequent frame before libatalk/dsi/dsi_write.c detects the inconsistency. The irreversible stream desynchronization lets the attacker control the next parsed DSI header and payload and corrupts protocol framing for the connection. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.1. |
| Netatalk is a Free and Open Source file server suite for Unix-like operating systems. From 1.5.0 until 4.5.1, dsi_tcp_open in libatalk/dsi/dsi_tcp.c silently limits the bytes read from an unauthenticated DSI frame received on TCP/548 to server_quantum when the attacker-controlled dsi_len is larger, without rejecting the frame or draining the declared remainder. The same silent dsi_len truncation pattern exists in libatalk/dsi/dsi_stream.c. The leftover bytes remain queued on the TCP connection and the next dsi_stream_receive call interprets them as a new DSI header and payload, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to smuggle one or more additional attacker-controlled DSI frames into the same connection. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.1. |
| fqterm 0.9.9 before 0.9.11 contains an out-of-bounds memory access vulnerability in its SSH client that trusts unchecked server-supplied length fields for allocations, copies and read positions. Malicious servers or man-in-the-middle attackers can send crafted lengths in getString(), KEXINIT name-lists, key parsing or packet framing before host key verification to crash the client. |
| Convert::ASN1 versions before 0.37 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via unchecked exponent length in binary REAL decoding.
Binary REAL decoding never bounds-checks the exponent length against the available content. For a minimal one-byte binary REAL, the exponent byte is read from outside the element, making the mantissa length -1. Perl reads a negative length as an offset from the end of the string, so the mantissa is nearly all of the input that follows the element. The long-form exponent path also omits the extra length octet when sizing the mantissa.
An attacker who controls the decoded data can exhaust CPU with a list of such values, as each mantissa loop iterates over the remaining input. The decoded values are also computed from bytes outside each element. |
| Cesanta Mongoose 7.21 before 7.24 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in rx_ip6() checksum validation that allows remote unauthenticated attackers to read past received packets by sending IPv6 extension headers. Attackers can send a single IPv6 TCP or ICMPv6 packet with extension headers, causing tcp6csum_ok() and icmp6csum_ok() to use the full payload length and read adjacent receive-buffer memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: interface: validate the IP header on xmit
Packets injected into an xfrm interface (e.g. AF_PACKET on an xfrmi
device) reach the xfrm output path without IP header validation, but
xfrm4_transport_output() uses iph->ihl for __skb_pull() and memmove()
and expects the header to be valid.
vti_tunnel_xmit() already calls pskb_inet_may_pull() before handing
packets to the xfrm output path. Do the same in xfrmi_xmit() and
perform the header checks ip_rcv_core()/ip6_rcv_core() do on entry
to the IP stack: reject wrong IP versions and malformed IPv4 header
lengths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
9p/xen: validate the response size from the backend
p9_xen_response() takes the length of an incoming response from the ring
-- the first field of the 9p header, which the Xen transport reuses as
its framing header -- and uses it to advance the consumer index, but
never checks that it is at least the header size or no larger than the
number of bytes the backend has actually produced.
A malicious or buggy backend can post a response whose size is smaller
than the header (for example 0). The consumer index then never advances,
so the response work re-reads the same ring contents instead of making
progress. In testing this raced with the teardown that the malformed
reply triggers and dereferenced a freed p9_client:
9pfs 9pfs-0: Wrong req tag=ffff
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000060
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5 #6 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events p9_xen_response
RIP: 0010:idr_find+0x4/0x10
RSP: 0018:ffffbf5d80063de8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffa229c21195a0 RCX: ffffa229c2400000
RDX: ffffa229c11c2200 RSI: 000000000000ffff RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: 000000000000ffff R08: 3fffffffffffdfff R09: ffffffffffffffff
R10: 3fffffffffffdfff R11: ffffffff87a60e80 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: 0000000000100000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa22a7661c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000060 CR3: 000000003ac34002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
p9_tag_lookup+0x2b/0x90
p9_xen_response+0x17c/0x2e0
process_one_work+0x16a/0x3a0
worker_thread+0x172/0x2e0
kthread+0xdd/0x110
ret_from_fork+0x18b/0x240
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
CR2: 0000000000000060
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Reject a response whose size is outside [sizeof(header), queued] before
using it, matching the validation the backend already applies to
incoming requests. |
| libp2p is a JavaScript implementation of the libp2p networking stack. Prior to 5.1.22, the @libp2p/crypto code reached by the default Identify service accepts a remote peer’s crafted publicKey before peer-id or signature verification and passes it through publicKeyFromProtobuf to the ASN.1 DER decoder. readLength in packages/crypto/src/keys/rsa/der.ts accepts long-form element lengths larger than the remaining buffer, causing readInteger and related readers to loop synchronously over an attacker-claimed length from a very small key blob. Because decoding occurs in one event-loop tick before the remotePeer equality check in packages/protocol-identify/src/identify.ts, the Identify timeout cannot interrupt it, allowing repeated unauthenticated connections to stall all timers and peers and transiently exhaust memory. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.22. |
| In Open Object Rexx (ooRexx) before 5.2.0, RXAPI has a heap buffer over-read in a QueueManager DataQueue::addmethod. In particular, the code blindly trusts the message.parameter1 value provided by the client as the size used to fill the data from the queueData heap buffer. An attacker sends a large parameter1 value in an ADD_TO_SESSION_QUEUE or ADD_TO_NAMED_QUEUE message and then retrieves data with a PULL_FROM_SESSION_QUEUE message. (A very large value causes a process crash.) |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.4 and 1.5.1, there is a client-side out-of-bounds read in the AtomicReadFile-ACK record-access handling path. The issue is caused by a mismatch between a remote returnedRecordCount value and the fixed local fileData[] array capacity in BACNET_ATOMIC_READ_FILE_DATA. The ACK decode path preserves the remote RecordCount, discards storage for excess records without truncating that count, and a downstream sink later iterates over the original RecordCount and indexes fileData[i] out of bounds. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.4 and 1.5.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: reject oversized nested action attrs
Open vSwitch stores generated flow actions as nlattrs, whose nla_len
field is u16. Commit a1e64addf3ff ("net: openvswitch: remove
misbehaving actions length check") allowed the total sw_flow_actions
stream to grow beyond 64 KiB, which is valid, but also removed the last
guard preventing a generated nested action attribute from exceeding
U16_MAX.
An oversized generated container can thus be closed with a truncated
nla_len. A later dump or teardown then walks a structurally different
stream than the one that was validated. In particular, an oversized
nested CLONE/CT action may cause subsequent bytes in the generated
stream to be interpreted as independent actions.
Keep the larger total-action-stream behavior, but make nested action
close reject generated containers that do not fit in nla_len, and return
the error through all callers. For recursive SAMPLE, CLONE, DEC_TTL, and
CHECK_PKT_LEN builders, trim resource-owning action-list tails in reverse
construction order before discarding failed wrappers, so resources copied
into the rejected tails are released before the wrappers are removed.
Most failed outer wrappers are discarded by truncating actions_len after
child resources have been released. CHECK_PKT_LEN also trims its parent
after branch resources are gone. SET/TUNNEL close failures unwind their
known tun_dst ownership directly, and SET_TO_MASKED has no external
ownership and truncates on close failure. |
| The Erlang/OTP ssl application does not validate that the PSK identity list and binder list carried in a TLS 1.3 ClientHello pre-shared key extension have equal length before passing them to the session ticket handler. In tls_handshake_1_3:handle_pre_shared_key/3, an OfferedPreSharedKeys record with a mismatched number of identities and binders is forwarded directly to tls_server_session_ticket:use/4, which crashes the session ticket handler process.
An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a single crafted ClientHello to a TLS 1.3 server with session tickets enabled (stateful or stateless mode) and permanently disrupt session ticket handling on that listener. New TLS 1.3 handshakes complete but subsequently crash when the server attempts to issue a session ticket, effectively making TLS 1.3 unusable on the affected listener until the ssl application is restarted. TLS 1.2 connections are not affected.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 22.2 before OTP 27.3.4.14, OTP 28.5.0.3, and OTP 29.0.3, corresponding to ssl from 9.5 before 11.2.12.10, 11.6.0.3, and 11.7.3. |
| tcpflow before 1.7.0 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read process memory by sending packets with forged IP payload lengths. Attackers can inject crafted IPv4 or IPv6 TCP packets into captured traffic or pcap files to leak adjacent memory into reconstructed flow files or crash tcpflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: ems_usb: validate CPC message lengths
ems_usb_read_bulk_callback() walks CPC messages packed in one USB
receive buffer.
Check that each declared message fits in the URB payload. Also require the
type-specific payload to cover the fields used by the CAN, state, error and
overrun handlers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: spi-nor: swp: Improve locking user experience
In the case of the first block being locked (or the few first blocks),
if the user want to fully unlock the device it has two possibilities:
- either it asks to unlock the entire device, and this works;
- or it asks to unlock just the block(s) that are currently locked,
which fails.
It fails because the conditions "can_be_top" and "can_be_bottom" are
true. Indeed, in this case, we unlock everything, so the TB bit does not
matter. However in the current implementation, use_top would be true (as
this is the favourite option) and lock_len, which in practice should be
reduced down to 0, is set to "nor->params->size - (ofs + len)" which is
a positive number. This is wrong.
An easy way is to simply add an extra condition. In the unlock() path,
if we can achieve the same result from both sides, it means we unlock
everything and lock_len must simply be 0. A comment is added to clarify
that logic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Check endpoint numbers at parsing Scarlett2 mixer interfaces
The Scarlett2 mixer quirk in USB-audio driver may hit a NULL
dereference when a malformed USB descriptor is passed, since it
assumes the presence of an endpoint in the parsed interface in
scarlett2_find_fc_interface(), as reported by fuzzer.
For avoiding the NULL dereference, just add the sanity check of
bNumEndpoints and skip the invalid interface. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
EFI/CPER: don't go past the ARM processor CPER record buffer
There's a logic inside GHES/CPER to detect if the section_length
is too small, but it doesn't detect if it is too big.
Currently, if the firmware receives an ARM processor CPER record
stating that a section length is big, kernel will blindly trust
section_length, producing a very long dump. For instance, a 67
bytes record with ERR_INFO_NUM set 46198 and section length
set to 854918320 would dump a lot of data going a way past the
firmware memory-mapped area.
Fix it by adding a logic to prevent it to go past the buffer
if ERR_INFO_NUM is too big, making it report instead:
[Hardware Error]: Hardware error from APEI Generic Hardware Error Source: 1
[Hardware Error]: event severity: recoverable
[Hardware Error]: Error 0, type: recoverable
[Hardware Error]: section_type: ARM processor error
[Hardware Error]: MIDR: 0xff304b2f8476870a
[Hardware Error]: section length: 854918320, CPER size: 67
[Hardware Error]: section length is too big
[Hardware Error]: firmware-generated error record is incorrect
[Hardware Error]: ERR_INFO_NUM is 46198
[ rjw: Subject and changelog tweaks ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: validate mesh send advertising payload length
mesh_send() currently bounds MGMT_OP_MESH_SEND by total command
length, but it never verifies that the bytes supplied for the
flexible adv_data[] array actually match the embedded adv_data_len
field. MGMT_MESH_SEND_SIZE only covers the fixed header, so a
truncated command can still pass the existing 20..50 byte range
check and later drive the async mesh send path past the end of the
queued command buffer.
Keep rejecting zero-length and oversized advertising payloads, but
validate adv_data_len explicitly and require the command length to
exactly match the flexible array size before queueing the request. |
| HTTP::Body versions before 1.23_01 for Perl lose track of chunk boundaries in chunked request bodies when a read ends inside a chunk.
In chunked mode, used when no content length is given, add() treats a chunk as complete once the buffer is as long as the chunk's declared size, but the buffer still holds the chunk-size line. When a read ends in the last bytes of a chunk, add() takes the chunk short and parses the leftover data as the next chunk-size line.
A remote attacker can make a chunked body never complete, hanging a server that reads until the body is done, and may make it complete early, leaving the remaining bytes to be read as the next request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: convert inline data to extents when truncate exceeds inline size
Add a check in ext4_setattr() to convert files from inline data storage
to extent-based storage when truncate() grows the file size beyond the
inline capacity. This prevents the filesystem from entering an
inconsistent state where the inline data flag is set but the file size
exceeds what can be stored inline.
Without this fix, the following sequence causes a kernel BUG_ON():
1. Mount filesystem with inode that has inline flag set and small size
2. truncate(file, 50MB) - grows size but inline flag remains set
3. sendfile() attempts to write data
4. ext4_write_inline_data() hits BUG_ON(write_size > inline_capacity)
The crash occurs because ext4_write_inline_data() expects inline storage
to accommodate the write, but the actual inline capacity (~60 bytes for
i_block + ~96 bytes for xattrs) is far smaller than the file size and
write request.
The fix checks if the new size from setattr exceeds the inode's actual
inline capacity (EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_size) and converts the file to
extent-based storage before proceeding with the size change.
This addresses the root cause by ensuring the inline data flag and file
size remain consistent during truncate operations. |