| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/erdma: Use IRQ-safe XArray helpers for QP and CQ tables
Locked QP and CQ lookups from EQ interrupts can deadlock with
create-path XArray updates. If an interrupt arrives while the create
path holds the plain xa_lock, the lookup spins forever trying to
acquire the same lock.
Use IRQ-safe XArray helpers for all QP and CQ create-path updates,
including the GSI QP store and error paths. Initialize both arrays with
XA_FLAGS_LOCK_IRQ so sleeping allocations preserve interrupt state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mad: Fix receive buffer leak when PKey enforcement fails
ib_mad_complete_recv() initializes mad_recv_wc->rmpp_list and then runs
ib_mad_enforce_security() before linking recv_buf onto that list. On
failure it calls ib_free_recv_mad(), which only walks rmpp_list and frees
the ib_mad_private of every buffer found there. As the list is still
empty at that point, nothing is freed at all.
The caller cannot clean up either: ib_mad_recv_done() sets recv to NULL
right after ib_mad_complete_recv() returns, assuming the MAD layer took
ownership of the buffer. Every MAD that fails the PKey check therefore
leaks one ib_mad_private (about 300 bytes per IB port MAD, ~2K for OPA),
and a remote node can trigger this repeatedly by sending MADs with a
wrong PKey.
Link recv_buf onto rmpp_list right after the list is initialized, so the
error path has something to free. |
| All versions of Zammad including the latest alpha enable the local zammad user to escalate privileges to root. |
| Zammad versions 6.3.0 to 6.5.4 are vulnerable a session hijack vulnerability that leads to remote code execution as the zammad user. The bug is also present in version 7.0.0 to version 7.1.2, but not exploitable due to changes in the underlying framework. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: fix use-after-free of retransmit_skb_hint in tcp_send_synack()
When tcp_send_synack() replaces the cloned SYN skb at the head of the
retransmit queue with a copy, it frees the original with
tcp_rtx_queue_unlink_and_free() and only repairs tp->highest_sack.
tp->retransmit_skb_hint keeps pointing at the freed
skbuff_fclone_cache object.
The dangling hint is read in tcp_verify_retransmit_hint() and used as
the root of the rbtree walk in tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue(). An
unprivileged TFO client (sendmsg(MSG_FASTOPEN)) can arm the hint with
an attacker-supplied ICMP fragmentation-needed message, after which a
simultaneous open frees the armed SYN skb:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tcp_mark_skb_lost (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:1316)
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800604d928 by task swapper/1/0
Call Trace:
tcp_mark_skb_lost (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:1316)
tcp_simple_retransmit (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3158)
tcp_v4_err (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:587)
Sync the hint to the copy. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: preserve mremap address delta when skipping page tables
move_hugetlb_page_tables() optimizes mremap() by advancing to the last
entry in the page table when the source page table does not exist, either
initially or after unsharing a PMD table. The common loop increment then
steps to the first entry in the next page table.
However, the code advances both the source and destination addresses to
the last entries in their respective page tables, which is wrong. The
destination address must be advanced only by the same amount as the source
address.
If the source and destination offsets within their page tables differ, the
destination address can be advanced too far, causing follow-up issues.
Fix this by advancing the destination address by the source advance
distance.
With a reproducer, we were able to trigger a kernel panic on x86-64. With
this fix in place, we can no longer reproduce the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
swiotlb: use the adjusted address for the highmem page lookup
swiotlb_bounce() reads the page frame number from the slot's recorded
orig_addr, then advances orig_addr by tlb_offset to reach the address
the caller asked about. The highmem branch mixes the two: the offset
within the page comes from the adjusted address, the page from the value
before it.
Once the adjustment crosses a page boundary the pair no longer describes
one location, and the whole copy lands one page below the intended one
for a positive tlb_offset, one above for a negative one. DMA_FROM_DEVICE
writes the device data over the wrong page and leaves the intended one
stale, DMA_TO_DEVICE feeds the device from a page the mapping may not
cover. Partial syncs through dma_sync_single_range_for_*() are what make
tlb_offset non-zero.
The branch test is picked the same way, so a slot recorded in lowmem can
be adjusted into highmem and the lowmem path then hands a highmem
address to phys_to_virt().
Take both from orig_addr once it is final and keep pfn in the branch
that uses it. PhysHighMem() asks the question straight from the address,
as dma-debug already does. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: use hlist_del_init_rcu for state_cache and state_cache_input
Commit 14acf9652e56 ("xfrm: defensively unhash xfrm_state lists in
__xfrm_state_delete") converted bydst/bysrc/byseq/byspi from
hlist_del_rcu() to hlist_del_init_rcu() so that a second
__xfrm_state_delete() on the same object becomes a no-op rather than a
write through LIST_POISON pprev. It missed state_cache and
state_cache_input, which kept hlist_del_rcu():
- hlist_del_rcu() leaves pprev = LIST_POISON2 (non-NULL), so
hlist_unhashed() returns false.
- hlist_del_init_rcu() leaves pprev = NULL, so hlist_unhashed()
returns true.
A second __xfrm_state_delete() therefore enters __hlist_del() on the
already-deleted state_cache/state_cache_input nodes and does
WRITE_ONCE(*pprev, next) through LIST_POISON2 — a write use-after-free
once the slab is reused. The corruption can in turn cause a subsequent
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu traversal to follow a dangling next pointer,
producing the read use-after-free reported in xfrm_input_state_lookup().
Switch state_cache and state_cache_input to hlist_del_init_rcu() to
match the other four lists, closing the write use-after-free and, with
it, the read use-after-free it spawns. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exec: Cleanup POSIX timers right after de_thread()
A per-thread CPU timer holds a reference to the PID of the thread it is
attached to and, while it is armed, its node is queued in that thread's
posix_cputimers. The task is looked up by that PID.
When a non-leader thread exec()s, de_thread() changes which task owns
that PID. pid_task(timer->it.cpu.pid, PIDTYPE_PID) then returns NULL,
but the node is still queued on tsk, which is alive. timer_lock_sighand()
takes a failed lookup to mean that the node is already dequeued, so it
has nothing to undo.
begin_new_exec() calls posix_cpu_timers_exit(me) right after
exec_task_namespaces() and that removes the leftover node, so the state
normally stays invisible. But bprm->point_of_no_return is set before
de_thread(), so if unshare_files(), set_mm_exe_file(), exec_mmap() or
exec_task_namespaces() fails, the task dies before it gets there.
exit_itimers() then frees the k_itimer while its node is still queued,
and reaping tsk later erases that freed node from the rbtree.
In short:
the non-leader thread B the parent
timer_create(CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID)
timer_settime()
arm_timer() // the node is queued on B
execve()
de_thread(B)
exchange_tids(B, leader) // B's PID now belongs to the leader
release_task(leader)
__exit_signal(leader)
posix_cpu_timers_exit(leader) // cleans leader's queue, not B's
__unhash_process(leader) // that PID has no task anymore
exec_mmap()
mmap_read_lock_killable(old_mm)
kill(B, SIGKILL)
// -EINTR
get_signal()
do_exit()
exit_itimers()
posix_timer_delete()
posix_cpu_timer_del()
posix_timer_unhash_and_free() // freed while still queued
wait4()
release_task(B)
posix_cpu_timers_exit(B)
cleanup_timerqueue()
timerqueue_del() // use-after-free
Move the POSIX timer cleanup right after de_thread() before any of the
later failure conditions brings the task into do_exit().
[ tglx: Move the cleanup right after de_thread() ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lock the socket in sock_gettstamp()
sk->sk_flags must only be changed while holding the socket lock,
because sock_set_flag() and sock_reset_flag() use non atomic
operations (__set_bit() and __clear_bit()).
sock_gettstamp() is one of the last places where a bit of sk->sk_flags
is changed from a syscall without owning the socket lock, through
sock_enable_timestamp(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMP).
sk_set_memalloc() and sk_clear_memalloc() also change sk->sk_flags
without the socket lock, but their callers (nbd, iscsi_tcp, nvme-tcp,
sunrpc, wireguard) need a careful audit, this will be addressed in a
separate patch.
Jungwoo Lee and Wongi Lee reported an UDP socket use-after-free
caused by this bug: a SIOCGSTAMPNS_NEW ioctl racing with bind()
can cancel the SOCK_RCU_FREE bit that udp_lib_get_port() just set,
because both threads perform a read-modify-write on the same word.
CPU 0 (bind) CPU 1 (SIOCGSTAMPNS_NEW)
-------------------------------- ----------------------------
read sk_flags = F read sk_flags = F
compute F | BIT(SOCK_RCU_FREE) compute F | BIT(SOCK_TIMESTAMP)
store F | BIT(SOCK_RCU_FREE)
sk_add_node_rcu(sk, ...)
store F | BIT(SOCK_TIMESTAMP)
After the lost update, SOCK_RCU_FREE is clear while the socket is
visible to lockless UDP receive lookups. sk_destruct() then frees
the socket immediately instead of waiting for a RCU grace period,
while the receive path still holds a reference-less pointer to it:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ipv4_pktinfo_prepare+0x30/0x410
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888008806610 by task exploit/207
CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 207 Comm: exploit Not tainted 6.12.95+ #1
ipv4_pktinfo_prepare+0x30/0x410
udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x51c/0x1180
udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x109/0x350
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x14b/0x310
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x29d/0x390
ip_local_deliver+0x24d/0x2a0
Only grab the socket lock when SOCK_TIMESTAMP has to be set,
to keep the common case lockless. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: virt_wifi: don't transfer operstate before register
virt_wifi_newlink() calls netif_stacked_transfer_operstate() before
register_netdevice(). If the lower device is dormant, that queues the
new netdev on lweventlist while it is still uninitialized. If
registration fails after that, for example because of an invalid name
such as "bad/name", free_netdev() immediately frees the object. A
later linkwatch_fire_event() then use-after-frees the list entry.
Move the transfer to after netdev_upper_dev_link(), as macvlan and
ipvlan already do. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: Reject unregistering netdevs in ib_get_eth_speed
ib_device_get_netdev() intentionally returns a referenced net_device even
when it is unregistering, so matching and cleanup callers can still find
the association. The reference keeps struct net_device allocated, but does
not guarantee that the device remains operational.
ib_get_eth_speed() uses the returned device operationally by invoking its
ethtool callback. Although that call is made under RTNL, the function does
not verify the registration state first. An asynchronous RDMA port query
can therefore call into a netdev after NETDEV_UNREGISTER and ndo_uninit
have completed.
Check for NETREG_REGISTERED while holding RTNL and return -ENODEV for a
device which is being unregistered. Keeping RTNL across the check and the
ethtool operation prevents unregister from starting between them.
Keep the speed fallback and warning under RTNL as well, so the warning can
safely read netdev->name. Drop the netdev reference before releasing RTNL
once all accesses to the device are complete. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: don't filter by BSS type when removing stale entries
When an assoc AP switches to a channel that already has a BSS entry,
cfg80211_update_assoc_bss_entry() removes that entry before rehashing
the real one, since the two would otherwise collide in the BSS rbtree.
The lookup for that entry also required it to match the connection's BSS
type, so an entry advertising e.g. the IBSS capability bit was left in
place, and the following cfg80211_rehash_bss() then ran into it:
WARN_ON(!cmp)
Changing the type shouldn't really happen, but can be triggered by a
rogue AP/device, so drop the check and remove any entries matching
the comparison. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: wait for deferred control PDU completions before releasing the connection
isert_send_done() hands ISTATE_SEND_TASKMGTRSP, ISTATE_SEND_REJECT and
ISTATE_SEND_TEXTRSP completions off to isert_comp_wq and returns. The work
item then runs isert_completion_put() -> isert_put_cmd(), which reads
isert_conn->conn and takes conn->cmd_lock.
Nothing orders that work item against teardown. isert_wait_conn() queues
isert_release_work, which frees isert_conn, and iscsit_close_connection()
frees the iscsit_conn right after it returns, so the queued work can run
against freed memory.
Count the deferred control PDU completions per connection and let
isert_wait_conn() wait for them before the release work is queued.
ISTATE_SEND_LOGOUTRSP is deliberately not counted: that branch runs
iscsit_logout_post_handler(), which ends up waiting for
conn->conn_wait_comp, and that completion is only sent by
iscsit_close_connection() after it has called iscsit_wait_conn().
Waiting for it here would deadlock. Its wait stays the existing
isert_wait4logout().
The splat below is from a kernel with tracing printk()s and an msleep(200)
injected into isert_do_control_comp() to widen the window:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in isert_put_cmd+0x53d/0x620
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881054f1038 by task kworker/u17:1/182
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 182 Comm: kworker/u17:1 Tainted: G B 7.2.0-rc5-TWIDE-gb8babf08acc7 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: isert_comp_wq isert_do_control_comp
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
print_report+0xd0/0x630
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x70
? isert_put_cmd+0x53d/0x620
kasan_report+0xce/0x100
? isert_put_cmd+0x53d/0x620
isert_put_cmd+0x53d/0x620
? isert_completion_put+0x305/0x330
? isert_do_control_comp+0x2ef/0x310
process_one_work+0x633/0x1030
? assign_work+0x11d/0x370
worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0
? recalc_sigpending+0x15c/0x1e0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0
? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
? __switch_to+0x572/0xdd0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 48:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370
isert_cma_handler+0x1e3/0x2ae0
cma_cm_event_handler+0x3e/0x240
cma_ib_req_handler+0x17d9/0x4490
cm_process_work+0x41/0x330
cm_work_handler+0x5727/0xc160
process_one_work+0x633/0x1030
worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10
kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0
ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Freed by task 184:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
kfree+0x121/0x380
iscsit_close_connection+0x7cf/0x1e60
iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit+0x1b6/0x360
iscsi_target_tx_thread+0x472/0x690
kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0
ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: don't free driver-owned scan requests
When an interface goes down while a scan is running, cfg80211 completes
the scan towards userspace and frees the scan request. However, the
driver can be convinced that it owns the request, since the cancellation
is (intended to be) asynchronous.
The WARN_ON() in the netdev notifier was meant to catch this, but it's
not actually avoidable, so it triggers and we get a UAF in scan_done().
There doesn't seem to be a great way around it, so just track that the
driver is still convinced it owns the request, and then just free it on
completion if it was already cancelled. Also remove the warnings since
they can trigger in the intended architecture. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
esp: downgrade zerocopy managed frags before mutating skb frags
On the out-of-place output path (esp->inplace == false) ESP rewrites the
skb frag array: esp_output_head() appends a trailer frag and
esp_output_tail() replaces the frags with a destination page, both
referenced with get_page().
When the skb carries zerocopy managed frags (SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS) the
payload frags are owned by the ubuf and must not be referenced or
unreferenced individually, but ESP mutates the frag array without ever
downgrading the skb. This breaks the managed-frag invariant two ways:
- esp_ssg_unref() walks the source scatterlist and drops a page
reference for every frag, including the ubuf-owned payload frags,
pushing their refcount below the GUP pin bias while the pages are
still pinned, i.e. a use-after-free of the zerocopy pages;
- esp_output_tail() installs its destination page as frag 0 with
get_page() but leaves SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS set, so
skb_release_data() takes the skip_unref branch and never drops that
reference, leaking the x->xfrag page at packet rate.
Fix this the way every other frag-mutating site does (__ip_append_data(),
__ip6_append_data(), tcp_sendmsg_locked()) and call
skb_zcopy_downgrade_managed() before ESP touches the frag array: it takes
a real reference on each existing frag and clears SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS,
so the per-frag unref in esp_ssg_unref() and the frag release in
skb_release_data() are both balanced and no mixed-ownership frag array is
left behind. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: Fix server use-after-free in cifs_chan_skip_or_disable()
When a secondary channel is no longer supported by the server,
cifs_chan_skip_or_disable() drops the channel reference with
cifs_put_tcp_session() and then continues to use the server pointer by
calling cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect() on it and reading its
primary_server pointer. cifs_put_tcp_session() can drop the last
reference of the channel and tear it down, so both the channel and the
primary server (whose reference is also dropped by
cifs_put_tcp_session()) can be freed before they are signaled for
reconnect.
Signal the channel and the primary server and capture the primary
server pointer before dropping the channel reference with
cifs_put_tcp_session(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm: RCU-free the scheduler-containing ring and VM objects
Both struct msm_ringbuffer and struct msm_gem_vm embed a struct
drm_gpu_scheduler. msm_ringbuffer_destroy() and the VM free callback
msm_gem_vm_free() call drm_sched_fini() on the embedded scheduler and then
free the containing object with plain kfree().
drm_sched_fence_get_timeline_name() returns fence->sched->name, and the
scheduler fence keeps a .release callback so it is not ops-detached on
signalling. A finished fence exported to userspace (the submit out-fence, or
a VM_BIND fence, via sync_file / drm_syncobj) keeps pointing at the embedded
scheduler after the ring/VM is freed, so a later get_timeline_name() --
reachable unprivileged through SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO -- dereferences freed slab
memory (KASAN slab-use-after-free read).
Per the dma-fence lifetime contract the exporter must keep the data backing a
signalled fence alive for an RCU grace period. Free the scheduler-containing
objects with kfree_rcu() instead of kfree().
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/750234/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: fix refcount bug in iwpm_get_nlmsg_request()
iwpm_get_nlmsg_request() initializes refcount _after_ list_add_tail()
making it accessible to global list where another CPU can kref_get()
on nlmsg_request causing a refcount "addition on 0" bug. Fix this
by initializing kref _before_ list_add_tail() so refcount for
nlmsg_request can be incremented/decremented normally. In addition,
also initialize every field before list_add_tail(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/ucma: Serialize join and leave on copy_to_user failure
rdma_join_multicast() queues RoCE work that later reads the ucma_multicast
through event->param.ud.private_data, then list_add()s the CMA multicast
at the head of id_priv->mc_list. rdma_leave_multicast() matches only by
sockaddr and destroys the first hit.
ucma_process_join() used to drop ctx->mutex after a successful join and
retake it only if copy_to_user() failed. Two concurrent JOIN_MCAST calls
with the same address can therefore insert a second CMA entry before the
first thread's leave. leave then cancels the newer work and the older
worker still dereferences the ucma_multicast that the first thread frees.
Keep ctx->mutex held from rdma_join_multicast() through copy_to_user() and,
on -EFAULT, through rdma_leave_multicast() so leave cannot miss this join.
Do not leave if join itself failed: that path never published this address
on mc_list, and a leave-by-addr would destroy an earlier successful join. |
