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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-68195 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7615: drop TXRX_NOTIFY on non-mmio buses PKT_TYPE_TXRX_NOTIFY is an mmio-only event, but mt7615_rx_check() and mt7615_queue_rx_skb() dispatch it to mt7615_mac_tx_free() on every bus. mt7615_mac_tx_free() cleans the DMA tx queues with mt76_queue_tx_cleanup(), which calls queue_ops->tx_cleanup(). Only the mmio queue ops implement that callback; on the mt7663 USB and SDIO buses it is NULL, so a TXRX_NOTIFY there calls a NULL pointer in the RX worker. Same defect as the mt7921 and mt7925 patches in this series. Drop the event on non-mmio buses via mt76_is_mmio(), as in commit 5683e1488aa9 ("wifi: mt76: connac: do not check WED status for non-mmio devices"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68194 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 4.8 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7921: drop TXRX_NOTIFY on non-mmio buses PKT_TYPE_TXRX_NOTIFY is an mmio-only event, but mt7921_rx_check() and mt7921_queue_rx_skb() dispatch it to mt7921_mac_tx_free() on every bus. mt7921_mac_tx_free() cleans the DMA tx queues with mt76_queue_tx_cleanup(), which calls queue_ops->tx_cleanup(). Only the mmio queue ops implement that callback; on USB and SDIO it is NULL, so a TXRX_NOTIFY there calls a NULL pointer in the RX worker: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:0x0 Call Trace: mt7921_mac_tx_free+0x64/0x310 [mt7921_common] mt7921_rx_check+0x5f/0xf0 [mt7921_common] mt76u_rx_worker+0x1b9/0x620 [mt76_usb] Drop the event on non-mmio buses via mt76_is_mmio(), as in commit 5683e1488aa9 ("wifi: mt76: connac: do not check WED status for non-mmio devices"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68190 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.9 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_wps_ie() rtw_get_wps_ie() iterates over IE data from network frames without validating that the IE header and payload fit within the remaining buffer before reading them. Specifically: - in_ie[cnt + 1] is read without checking cnt + 1 < in_len - memcmp(&in_ie[cnt + 2], ...) accesses cnt + 2 without bounds check - in_ie[cnt + 1] is used as length without verifying payload fits Add bounds checks at the top of the loop body to break early if fewer than 2 bytes remain for the IE header, or if the declared payload extends past the end of the buffer. Also require at least 4 bytes of payload before comparing the WPS OUI. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68188 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 4.8 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Fix session UAF in set_termios rfcomm_tty_set_termios() tests dlc->session without rfcomm_mutex and later passes the pointer to rfcomm_send_rpn(). The latter dereferences both session->initiator and session->sock. Meanwhile, krfcommd can unlink the DLC and free the session while holding rfcomm_mutex. The race can proceed as follows: TTY ioctl task krfcommd -------------- -------- load dlc->session enter rfcomm_send_rpn() lock rfcomm_mutex clear dlc->session free session unlock rfcomm_mutex read session->initiator KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rfcomm_send_rpn+0x297/0x2a0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810012a850 by task poc/92 Call Trace: rfcomm_send_rpn+0x297/0x2a0 rfcomm_tty_set_termios+0x50d/0x850 tty_set_termios+0x596/0x950 set_termios+0x46a/0x6e0 tty_mode_ioctl+0x152/0xbd0 tty_ioctl+0x915/0x1240 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x134/0x1c0 Allocated by task 92: rfcomm_session_add+0x9e/0x2e0 rfcomm_dlc_open+0x8b1/0xe00 rfcomm_dev_activate+0x85/0x1a0 rfcomm_tty_open+0x90/0x280 Freed by task 68: kfree+0x131/0x3c0 rfcomm_session_del+0x119/0x180 rfcomm_run+0x737/0x4710 Add rfcomm_dlc_send_rpn(), which holds rfcomm_mutex while it verifies that the DLC is still attached and sends the RPN frame. Have the TTY path use the helper and drop its unlocked session check. This keeps the session valid through both the frame construction and socket send. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68187 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exec: fix unsigned loop counter wrap in transfer_args_to_stack() The stop value is derived from bprm->p >> PAGE_SHIFT. The index variable is an unsigned long. If bprm->p drops below PAGE_SIZE and stop becomes zero the loop condition index >= stop is always true. After the index == 0 iteration the decrement wraps to ULONG_MAX and bprm->page[ULONG_MAX] reads sizeof(void *) bytes in front of the array. The pointer has wrapped to -1. That garbage pointer is then passed to kmap_local_page() and PAGE_SIZE bytes are copied from wherever that lands into the stack of the process being created. And the loop doesn't terminate either... Getting there only requires bprm->p < PAGE_SIZE. On !MMU bprm_set_stack_limit() and bprm_hit_stack_limit() are empty. So the only constraint on how far bprm->p is pushed down is valid_arg_len(), i.e. that each individual string still fits in what is left. bprm->p starts at PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *) so a single argument or environment string of a little over 31 pages leaves it in the first page: Oops - load access fault [#1] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: victim Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4 #1 epc : __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8 ra : transfer_args_to_stack+0xaa/0xae s4 : ffffffffffffffff s2 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ffffffdc98000000 a2 : 0000000000001000 status: 0000000a00001880 badaddr: ffffffdc98000000 cause: 0000000000000005 [<801a5324>] __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8 [<800d5f6a>] load_flat_binary+0x43a/0x65e [<800a2de4>] bprm_execve+0x1d4/0x316 [<800a351a>] do_execveat_common+0x12e/0x138 [<800a3d44>] __riscv_sys_execve+0x38/0x4e Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt This is an arcane bug but we should still fix it. Count down from MAX_ARG_PAGES so the loop ends when index reaches stop, stop == 0 included. The iterations performed are unchanged for every other value of stop. Only CONFIG_MMU=n builds are affected, transfer_args_to_stack() is used by binfmt_flat and binfmt_elf_fdpic on nommu only. The loop predates git history. commit 7e7ec6a93434 ("elf_fdpic_transfer_args_to_stack(): make it generic") only moved it from binfmt_elf_fdpic.c into fs/exec.c and narrowed the copy to the used part of the first page. The condition and the decrement are unchanged from 2.6.12-rc2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68186 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binfmt_misc: set have_execfd only once the interpreter is opened load_misc_binary() raises bprm->have_execfd as soon as it sees the 'O' (or 'C') flag. This happens well before it opens the interpreter. If that open fails the flag stays set on the bprm. binfmt_misc is at the head of the format list so an interpreter open failure that returns -ENOEXEC lets the search fall through to a later format. This means it runs the matched binary directly having never staged an interpreter. So bprm->executable is NULL while have_execfd falsely claims a descriptor is present. Consequently, begin_new_exec() dereferences the missing executable: would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable); and NULL derefs. Had it not, the hand-off later in the same function would have failed anyway. FD_ADD(0, bprm->executable) rejects a NULL file with -ENOMEM. Both sites are past the point of no return so the exec cannot be unwound either way. This can be reached by unprivileged users as binfmt_misc can be mounted in user namespaces. So a user can register an 'O' entry whose interpreter lives on a FUSE mount, have the FUSE server fail the open with -ENOEXEC and execute a native ELF file that matches the entry. have_execfd only means anything alongside the executable it describes which is not set until the interpreter has been opened and staged. So lets raise it there, next to execfd_creds, which is already set at that point. An open failure now leaves it clear, so the fallback format derives credentials from the binary and emits no AT_EXECFD, as it would for any native exec. The argv rewrite load_misc_binary() performs before the open is still not undone. This means the binary sees the interpreter path in argv[0] and its own path in argv[1] but that predates this change and only became observable once the exec stopped faulting. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68184 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cdrom: fix stack out-of-bounds read in CDROMVOLCTRL mmc_ioctl_cdrom_volume() first reads the audio control mode page into a 32-byte stack buffer with cgc->buflen set to 24. If the device reports a block descriptor, the function increases cgc->buflen to include that descriptor and reads the page again. For CDROMVOLCTRL, the function then builds a MODE SELECT parameter list by moving cgc->buffer forward by offset - 8 bytes. This drops the block descriptor from the outgoing payload and leaves a new 8-byte mode parameter header in front of the audio control page. However, cgc->buflen is left unchanged. With a standard 8-byte block descriptor, cgc->buffer points at buffer + 8 but cgc->buflen remains 32. cdrom_mode_select() therefore asks the low level packet path to write 32 bytes from that adjusted pointer, reading 8 bytes past the end of the 32-byte stack buffer. This is not hit by CDROMVOLREAD, and CDROMVOLCTRL only triggers it on drives that return a non-zero block descriptor length, which helps explain why it has gone unnoticed. The overread is also sent to the device as extra MODE SELECT payload, so it may not produce an obvious local failure. Reduce cgc->buflen by the same amount as the buffer pointer adjustment so the MODE SELECT transfer covers only the intended parameter list. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68183 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: stratix10-svc: fix memory leaks and list corruption bugs Fix a memory leak when gen_pool_alloc() fails by freeing pmem on the error path. Switch pmem allocation from devm_kzalloc() to kzalloc() with explicit kfree() in the free path to match its list-managed lifetime. Remove the erroneous list_del(&svc_data_mem) which corrupted the list head on failed lookups. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68182 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 4.4 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: comedi: comedi_parport: deal with premature interrupt Syzbot reported a general protection fault in `comedi_get_is_subdevice_running()`, which was called from the interrupt handler `parport_interrupt()` in the "comedi_parport" driver, but it does not currently have a C reproducer for the problem. It's probably due to a premature interrupt for one of two reasons: 1. The driver sets up the interrupt handler before the comedi subdevices used by the interrupt handler have been allocated, but does not disable the interrupt in the parallel port's CTRL register first. 2. The driver uses a user-supplied I/O port base address which Syzbot would have supplied, but it might not be backed by real parallel port hardware. Change the initialization order in the driver's comedi "attach" handler (`parport_attach()`) so that the hardware registers are initialized before the interrupt handler is requested. This should prevent premature interrupts occurring for real hardware. Also add a test to the interrupt handler to ensure the comedi device is fully attached and return early if it isn't. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68180 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: intel_th: fix MSC output device reference leak intel_th_output_open() looks up the output device with bus_find_device_by_devt(), which returns the device with a reference that must be dropped after use. commit 95fc36a234da ("intel_th: fix device leak on output open()") attempted to drop the reference from intel_th_output_release(). However, a successful open replaces file->f_op with the output driver file operations before returning, so close runs the output driver release callback instead. For MSC outputs, close runs intel_th_msc_release(), which only removes the per-file iterator and does not drop the device reference taken by intel_th_output_open(). Consequently, every successful MSC output open leaks one device reference. Drop the device reference from intel_th_msc_release(), which is the release path actually used for MSC output files. Remove the now-unused intel_th_output_release() callback from intel_th_output_fops. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68176 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 4.4 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix mmiotrace possible NULL dereferencing of hiter->dev If the mmio_pipe_open() fails to find a PCI device, the hiter->dev will be assigned to NULL. The mmiotrace read() function dereferences the hiter->dev if hiter exists. Change the test of the read to not only check hiter being NULL, but also the hiter->dev before dereferencing it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68175 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 4.4 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix resource leak on mmiotrace trace_pipe close The mmiotrace tracer was added May 12th 2008. At that time, resources created in pipe_open() could not be freed because there was not pipe_close function pointer of the tracer. The pipe_close function pointer was added in December 7th, 2009, but the mmiotrace tracer was not updated. mmio_pipe_open() allocates a header_iter and takes a pci_dev reference when trace_pipe is opened. mmio_close() frees them, but it was only wired to the tracer's .close callback. tracing_release_pipe() invokes .pipe_close, not .close, when the trace_pipe file is released. As a result, closing trace_pipe with the mmiotrace tracer active leaked the header_iter allocation and left a stale pci_dev reference. Set .pipe_close to mmio_close, matching how function_graph wires both callbacks to the same handler. Note, if the trace_pipe is read to completion, it will clean up the resources, but if one were to run: # head -n 1 /sys/kernel/tracing/trace_pipe VERSION 20070824 Over and over again, it would trigger a massive leak. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68165 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/core: validate ranges in damon_set_regions() DAMON core logic assumes zero length regions don't exist. However, a few DAMON API callers including DAMON_SYSFS, DAMON_RECLAIM and DAMON_LRU_SORT allow users to set empty monitoring target regions. This could result in WARN_ONCE() on CONFIG_DAMON_DEBUG_SANITY enabled kernel, and divide-by-zero from damon_merge_two_regions(). For example, the WANR_ONCE() can be triggered like below. # grep DAMON_DEBUG_SANITY /boot/config-$(uname -r) # CONFIG_DAMON_DEBUG_SANITY=y # damo start # cd /sys/kernel/mm/damon/admin/kdamonds/0 # echo 0 > contexts/0/targets/0/regions/0/start # echo 0 > contexts/0/targets/0/regions/0/end # echo commit > state # dmesg [....] [ 73.705780] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 73.707552] start 0 >= end 0 [ 73.708452] WARNING: mm/damon/core.c:359 at damon_new_region+0x6e/0x80, CPU#1: kdamond.0/758 [...] All DAMON API callers eventually use damon_set_regions() to setup the regions. Add the validation logic in the function. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68164 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/core: disallow overlapping input ranges for damon_set_regions() damon_set_regions() assumes the input ranges are sorted by the address and don't overlap each other. Hence the assumption was initially to be explicitly validated. But commit 97d482f4592f ("mm/damon/sysfs: reuse damon_set_regions() for regions setting") has mistakenly removed the validation. This can make DAMON behave in unexpected ways. At the best, the monitoring results snapshot will just look weird since there will be overlapping regions. DAMOS will also work weirdly, applying the same action multiple times for overlapping regions, and make DAMOS quota weird. More seriously, depending on the setup and regions updates sequence, negative size regions can be made. It will trigger WARN_ONCE() if the kernel is built with CONFIG_DAMON_DEBUG_SANITY=y. Depending on the monitoring results, the negative size region can further trigger division by zero in damon_merge_two_regions(). Note that some of the consequences including the WARN_ONCE() and the divide by zero depend on commits that were introduced after the root cause commit 97d482f4592f ("mm/damon/sysfs: reuse damon_set_regions() for regions setting"). Fix the problems by checking the assumption and returning an error if the input ranges don't meet the assumption. The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68151 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binfmt_elf_fdpic: only honour the first PT_INTERP The program header scan handles PT_INTERP from a switch nested in the scan loop, so its break leaves the switch and not the loop. A binary carrying more than one PT_INTERP runs the case again and overwrites both interpreter_name and interpreter. The previous name allocation leaks and so does the previous interpreter reference, along with the write denial open_exec() took on it. The denial is never released, so the file stays unwritable for as long as the system runs. An unprivileged caller reaches this with a crafted binary and repeats it at will. binfmt_elf stops at the first PT_INTERP. Do the same here. The flaw dates back to the driver's introduction in the pre-git history tree introduced in v2.6.11 by 91808d6ebe39 ("[PATCH] FRV: Add FDPIC ELF binary format driver"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68147 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices() When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices, then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(), blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one. Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because: - It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim. - fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free. For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that. (Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68137 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/x25: fix use-after-free in x25_kill_by_neigh() x25_kill_by_neigh() walks the global X.25 socket list looking for sockets attached to a terminating neighbour. x25_list_lock protects list membership while the lookup is in progress, but it does not pin a socket's lifetime after the lock is dropped. The function currently drops x25_list_lock before calling lock_sock(s). A concurrent close can run x25_release(), remove the same socket from x25_list, and drop the last socket reference in that window. The neighbour teardown path can then lock or inspect a freed struct sock/struct x25_sock. Take sock_hold(s) while x25_list_lock still proves that the list entry is live, then drop the temporary reference after the socket has been locked, rechecked, and released. Recheck x25_sk(s)->neighbour after lock_sock(), because another path may have disconnected the socket before this path acquired the socket lock. Restart the list walk after each disconnect because the list lock was dropped and the previous iterator state may no longer be valid. A QEMU/KASAN run against origin/master reproduced a slab-use-after-free in x25_kill_by_neigh(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68135 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.9 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hip04: fix RX buffer leak on build_skb failure When build_skb() fails in hip04_rx_poll(), the driver jumps to the refill path without releasing the current RX buffer and its DMA mapping. Installing a replacement buffer then overwrites the slot references and leaks both resources. Keep the current slot intact and return budget so NAPI retries the same buffer. Also free a newly allocated RX fragment when dma_map_single() fails. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68124 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 9.6 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mctp: serial: handle zero-length frames to prevent rx buffer overflow The MCTP serial receive state machine reads a frame length byte in mctp_serial_push_header() case 2 and validates it upper-bound-only: if (c > MCTP_SERIAL_FRAME_MTU) { dev->rxstate = STATE_ERR; } else { dev->rxlen = c; dev->rxpos = 0; dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA; ... } A length of zero passes this check, so rxlen is set to 0 and the state machine advances to STATE_DATA. In mctp_serial_push() STATE_DATA, the incoming byte is stored and rxpos incremented before the terminator is dev->rxbuf[dev->rxpos] = c; dev->rxpos++; dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA; if (dev->rxpos == dev->rxlen) { dev->rxpos = 0; dev->rxstate = STATE_TRAILER; } With rxlen == 0 the "rxpos == rxlen" terminator can never fire (rxpos is already 1 on the first data byte), so subsequent bytes are written past the end of the fixed 74-byte rxbuf, which is the last member of the netdev private area. Every following data byte is an attacker-controlled 1-byte out-of-bounds heap write, and the overflow continues until a frame (0x7e) or escape byte resets the parser -- effectively unbounded. Reaching this requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach the N_MCTP line discipline and bring the resulting mctpserialN netdev up, after which the bytes arrive via the tty receive path. Route a zero-length frame straight to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_DATA. The trailer/framing bytes are still consumed, and the frame resolves to a zero-length skb that the MCTP core rejects; the parser never enters STATE_DATA with rxlen == 0, so the out-of-bounds write can no longer occur. KASAN, on a frame of 0x7e 0x01 0x00 followed by data bytes (before this change): UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c:370 index 74 is out of range for type 'u8 [74]' BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf Write of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/u16:0 mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf tty_ldisc_receive_buf flush_to_ldisc Allocated by task 152: alloc_netdev_mqs mctp_serial_open v2: route zero-length frames to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_ERR so the trailer/framing bytes are still consumed (Jeremy Kerr). Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68115 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/gfx10: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON() There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases. (cherry picked from commit ac6f00beb658239bced4aaed9efbb04a35348d48) | ||||