| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| When a private repository is transferred to a user who lacks access, Gitea grants that recipient temporary read access as a collaborator so they can review the repository. Rejecting or cancelling the transfer did not revoke this collaboration, so the named recipient kept persistent read access to the private repository, including its code, issues, pull requests and wiki, and could clone it. The repository owner was not notified. Transfer-granted access is now removed while collaborations that existed before the transfer are preserved. |
| Gitea validates a repository migration hostname against its network allow and block lists before invoking Git, but the Git subprocess independently resolves the hostname when connecting. An attacker who can start a migration and control the destination's DNS can change the address between validation and connection to reach a blocked internal address. The affected path is the Git clone operation; validation in the migration HTTP client's dialer does not protect the independently connecting Git subprocess. |
| Gitea's OAuth2 and OpenID Connect sign-in paths do not require a WebAuthn challenge when WebAuthn is the account's only configured second factor. A party able to authenticate through the affected external identity flow can obtain a full session without the passkey verification enforced during password login. One affected path can also persist an external identity link, extending the compromise beyond the initial session; accounts with TOTP configured are outside the reported WebAuthn-only scenario. |
| Gitea validated the initial remote URL for push mirrors, wiki remote checks, and fetches of migrated pull request heads, but the subsequent raw Git operations followed HTTP redirects without revalidating the destination. A repository administrator using a policy-allowed endpoint that redirects could make Gitea's Git client send requests to an address that the outbound host policy would otherwise block. The impact depends on the configured policy and the internal services reachable from the server. |
| Gitea Actions blocks the jobs of workflow runs from first-time fork pull request contributors until a maintainer approves the run. The rerun path only required a run to be finished and built the new attempt's jobs without considering the pending approval, so when a user with Actions write access cancelled a run that was awaiting approval and then re-ran it, the new jobs were created as waiting rather than blocked while the run still recorded that approval was required. Cancelling and re-running stale fork checks is a routine action that does not involve the approval control, so where Actions is enabled and a matching runner is registered, workflow code taken from the fork pull request head could run on the repository's runners without an explicit approval. |
| When Gitea's built-in SSH server is enabled (`START_SSH_SERVER = true`), the presented public key was looked up with an SQL `LIKE` comparison of its encoded content, which is case-insensitive on some databases, including the default SQLite. An attacker who can construct a case variant of another user's registered RSA public key for which they can derive the private key could have that key matched to the victim's account and authenticate over SSH as that user. Keys are now looked up by fingerprint. |
| A user who can open a fork pull request can place workflow content with a shared run-level concurrency group into a Gitea Actions run that is awaiting approval. When a later run in that group cancels the blocked job, the run becomes terminal while still marked as needing approval. If a maintainer later approves the run, Gitea passed the already-cancelled job back through concurrency preparation, set it to waiting, and made it claimable by a matching runner, executing fork-controlled workflow code. Exploitation requires the maintainer's later approval action, Actions to be enabled, and a runner that accepts the repository's jobs. |
| Gitea's container registry served blob downloads with a `Content-Type` taken from the media type declared in pushed image manifests, without a `Content-Disposition` or restrictive content security policy. A user who can push container images can publish a blob containing HTML and JavaScript with a `text/html` media type. When a victim who is authenticated to the instance opens the blob URL in a browser, the script runs on the Gitea origin and can perform actions as the victim, such as creating API tokens. |
| When a Gitea Actions run was inserted, older runs in the same workflow-level concurrency group were cancelled without checking whether the new run still needed approval. Because fork pull request runs are inserted under the base repository, a user who can open a pull request from a fork could cancel trusted in-progress runs that share a concurrency group with `cancel-in-progress` enabled, without approval and without running any code. On self-hosted runners this can interrupt deployments and leave partial state behind. |
| Gitea's repository migration and pull mirror egress checks could be bypassed with a hostname that returns multiple DNS answers, because the address that was validated was not necessarily the address Git later connected to. A low-privileged user who can create migrations or mirrors could direct the server to internal services, reading from and writing to reachable internal Git or HTTP endpoints. Content from internal responses could additionally be disclosed through migration and mirror error messages. |
| Gitea before 1.27.1 allows remote code execution via the diffpatch API through Git hook installation. |
| OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009) |
| Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API |
| Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session |
| Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access |
| Branch Protection Bypass via PR Retargeting Preserves Stale `official` Approval Flag |
| Webhooks created by a collaborator keep firing after their repo access is revoked → ongoing real-time exfiltration of private repo content (incomplete revocation cleanup in `DeleteCollaboration`) |
| Cross-repository issue/comment attachment re-linking can expose private attachment content |
| Repository Visibility Manipulation via Git Push Options |
| SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata |
