| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix request buffer leak in smb2_new_read_req()
smb2_new_read_req() allocates the request buffer with
smb2_plain_req_init() but only publishes it to the caller with
*buf = req at the very end of the function. Two error returns sit in
between:
rc = smb2_plain_req_init(SMB2_READ, io_parms->tcon, server,
(void **) &req, total_len);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (server == NULL)
return -ECONNABORTED;
[...]
rdata->mr = smbd_register_mr(server->smbd_conn,
&rdata->subreq.io_iter,
true, need_invalidate);
if (!rdata->mr)
return -EAGAIN;
On either of them the buffer is neither released nor handed back, so
it is leaked. The caller cannot clean up after it: smb2_async_readv()
does 'goto out' on a non-zero return, which skips the
cifs_small_buf_release(buf) at async_readv_out, and buf has not been
assigned at that point in any case.
The write path has never had this problem. smb2_async_writev()
registers the memory region inline and jumps to its release label
instead of returning:
wdata->mr = smbd_register_mr(...);
if (!wdata->mr) {
rc = -EAGAIN;
goto async_writev_out;
}
Commit b7972092199f ("cifs: smbd: Retry on memory registration
failure") changed both sides from -ENOBUFS to -EAGAIN in a single
patch, which puts the two shapes next to each other.
Only the -EAGAIN return is reachable in practice, because
smb2_plain_req_init() calls smb2_reconnect() first and that already
fails with -EIO when server is NULL, before anything is allocated.
Both returns are given the same treatment here rather than leaving
one of them correct only by accident.
Because -EAGAIN is a replayable error, the failure also reaches the
retry block at the end of smb2_async_readv(), which marks the
subrequest NETFS_SREQ_NEED_RETRY, so a failing registration can be
retried rather than ending the I/O, and every attempt that reaches it
leaks another buffer. smb2_should_replay() short-circuits on
tcon->retry, so on a hard mount the attempt count is not bounded by
the retrans setting.
Only the asynchronous read path is affected. The synchronous
SMB2_read() caller passes rdata == NULL and the memory registration
block is guarded on rdata.
The memory registration failure path was pointed out by the Sashiko
AI reviewer while it was reviewing an unrelated patch to
smb2_async_readv(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: fix kmap_local_page() usage in compress
Several compressed I/O paths discard the address returned by
kmap_local_page() and later access or unmap the page using page_address().
This is invalid for highmem pages, and local mappings must also be unmapped
using the address returned by kmap_local_page().
Map each destination page in ntfs_decompress() only while producing the
current sub-block. Use memcpy_from_page(), memcpy_to_page(), and
memzero_page() for the other page accesses. Remove unnecessary local
mappings from ntfs_write_cb(), where pages are accessed through the vmap()
mapping. |
| Local privilege escalation due to insecure file permissions. The following products are affected: Acronis Backup plugin for cPanel & WHM (Linux) before build 1.9.3.1021, Acronis Backup extension for Plesk (Linux) before build 1.8.11.638, Acronis Backup plugin for DirectAdmin (Linux) before build 1.2.3.238. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: free pending qentry in smc_llc_flow_stop() before memset
smc_llc_flow_stop() resets a flow struct with a blind memset:
spin_lock_bh(&lgr->llc_flow_lock);
memset(flow, 0, sizeof(*flow));
flow->type = SMC_LLC_FLOW_NONE;
spin_unlock_bh(&lgr->llc_flow_lock);
If flow->qentry is non-NULL at this point the pointer is overwritten without the
allocation being freed, leaking one kmalloc object.
A late-arriving duplicate CONFIRM_LINK or ADD_LINK_CONT message can set
flow->qentry after the legitimate message has been consumed by the waiter via
smc_llc_flow_qentry_clr() (which NULLs the pointer but leaves flow->type
non-zero) but before the flow completes and smc_llc_flow_stop() runs. In that
window the duplicate is stashed into flow->qentry, and then lost when
smc_llc_flow_stop() zeros the struct.
Call smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() inside the lock before the memset.
smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() already checks flow->qentry before freeing, so the
normal case where no entry is pending is a no-op. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: fix 32-bit backlog wrap in gred, bfifo and plug enqueue
gred_enqueue(), bfifo_enqueue() and plug_enqueue() admit a packet when the
current backlog plus the packet length fits within the queue limit:
sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (gred default VQ)
gred_backlog+qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= q->limit (gred configured VQ)
sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (bfifo)
sch->qstats.backlog + skb->len <= q->limit (plug)
sch->qstats.backlog and q->backlog are u32, and qdisc_pkt_len()/skb->len
are unsigned int, so all sums are computed in 32 bits and wrap at 2^32.
Once the true backlog exceeds 4 GiB the wrapped sum becomes small and
admission keeps succeeding, so the queue grows without bound and the kernel
can be driven to OOM.
Promote the sums to u64 so admission stops once the true backlog exceeds
the limit. The limit is u32, so the bounded queue stays below 2^32 and
the stored u32 backlog never wraps.
The bug can only be reproduced as root (albeit with ridiculous setup):
attach a gred (or bfifo/plug) qdisc with a limit near 4 GiB,
leaving the default VQ unconfigured (for gred), and drive >4 GiB of
queued traffic (e.g. via a size table / stab to inflate qdisc_pkt_len,
or sustained high-rate traffic). The u32 backlog+len sum wraps at 2^32,
admission keeps succeeding, and the queue grows unboundedly to OOM. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: fix NULL pointer dereference in __xsk_rcv()
In the __xsk_rcv() multi-buffer path, xsk_buff_alloc() is called in a
loop without checking its return value. xsk_buff_can_alloc() only
counts fill queue entries without validating their addresses, so it
can succeed while xsk_buff_alloc() rejects all remaining entries and
returns NULL.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000000
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range
[0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:__xsk_rcv+0x426/0xc20 (net/xdp/xsk.c:350)
Call Trace:
xsk_generic_rcv+0x26d/0x5f0
xdp_do_generic_redirect+0x3c5/0xcf0
do_xdp_generic+0x92f/0xe70
__netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0xf7e/0x2b30
Fix this with a two-stage transaction. First allocate and stage all
buffers required for the packet, recycling all staged buffers with
xsk_buff_free() if any allocation fails. Only after this stage
succeeds, copy the data, reserve the RX descriptors, and release the
buffers in an error-free loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: mtpav: shut down output timer before card teardown
snd_mtpav_output_timer() rearms chip->timer while holding
chip->spinlock and accesses the card-private mtpav state.
snd_mtpav_free() currently takes the same lock and calls
timer_delete() when the timer is active. This only removes a
pending timer; it does not wait for a callback that is already
running and does not prevent the callback from rearming the timer.
A callback running on another CPU can therefore continue after
snd_mtpav_free() releases the lock and access the card-private
state while the card is being torn down. It can also rearm the
timer after timer_delete() has returned.
Call timer_shutdown_sync() without holding chip->spinlock. This
waits for any running callback to finish and prevents further
rearming before the card-private mtpav state is released. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_balloon: quiesce balloon work before device shutdown
Commit 8bd2fa086a04 ("virtio: break and reset virtio devices on
device_shutdown()") added a generic virtio bus .shutdown handler that
breaks and resets every virtio device during device_shutdown(), i.e. on
reboot and kexec.
virtio_balloon provides no .shutdown of its own, so that generic path
runs while the balloon's asynchronous work is still armed. Once the
device has been broken, virtqueue_add_inbuf() in
virtballoon_free_page_report() returns -EIO and trips its
WARN_ON_ONCE(). On a kernel booted with panic_on_warn that turns an
ordinary reboot, for example a kexec based upgrade, into a fatal panic
in the middle of device_shutdown(), so the machine never reaches the
new kernel.
Relaxing that single WARN_ON_ONCE() would only hide the symptom: the
inflate/deflate and OOM paths do not warn, they call
wait_event(vb->acked, ...) and would instead block forever on a broken
queue that can no longer complete. The device has to be quiesced, not
just kept quiet.
Add a .shutdown handler that quiesces the balloon via the shared
virtballoon_quiesce() helper while the device is still alive, and only
then breaks and resets it via virtio_device_shutdown(). Unlike
virtballoon_remove() the balloon workqueue is not destroyed, as shutdown
does not free the device and cancel_work_sync() together with stop_update
already prevent any further work from being queued. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vdpa_sim: fix cleanup after worker creation failure
vdpasim_create() leaves vdpasim->worker as an ERR_PTR when
kthread_run_worker() fails. The error path then drops the device
reference, which releases the partially initialized simulator.
vdpasim_free() unconditionally passes the worker pointer to
kthread_destroy_worker(), so the ERR_PTR is dereferenced and can trigger
a general protection fault.
Store the worker error, clear the pointer, and only clean up the worker
when it was successfully initialized. Also make the release path tolerate
partially initialized objects by guarding virtqueue and IOTLB cleanup,
since the same release path can be reached from other initialization
failures.
I found this bug myself, though the patch was written with AI assistance. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: add missing ref_tracker_dir_exit() to alloc_netdev_mqs()
sashiko is reporting that trying to read /sys/kernel/debug/ref_tracker/*
causes use-afer-free crash when either alloc_percpu() or dev_addr_init()
in alloc_netdev_mqs() failed, for commit 4d92b95ff2f9 ("net: add net device
refcount tracker infrastructure") added ref_tracker_dir_exit() to only
free_netdev() path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86/amd/hsmp: Reject negative power cap writes in hwmon
hsmp_hwmon_write() takes the user-supplied hwmon value as a signed long
and assigns "val / MICROWATT_PER_MILLIWATT" to msg.args[0], which is a
__u32. MICROWATT_PER_MILLIWATT is an unsigned long, so a negative write
to power1_cap (e.g. "echo -1 > power1_cap") is first converted to a huge
unsigned value by the division and then stored into the u32 argument.
As a result a nonsensical, multi-gigawatt socket power limit is sent to
the SMU via HSMP_SET_SOCKET_POWER_LIMIT instead of the write being
rejected.
Reject negative values with -EINVAL before the conversion.
Tested with HSMP enabled:
CAP=$(dirname $(grep -l amd_hsmp_hwmon \
/sys/class/hwmon/hwmon*/name | head -1))/power1_cap
# negative write
echo -1000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
# valid positive write must still work
echo 400000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
Before:
# echo -1000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
ret=0 <- accepted; bogus limit sent to SMU
# echo 400000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
ret=0
After:
# echo -1000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
ret=1 <- rejected with -EINVAL
# echo 400000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
ret=0 <- valid write still works |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: don't check the listener's sk_err in vsock_accept()
Syzbot reported an issue which can be reproduced with these steps:
r0 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0)
bind(r0, {VMADDR_CID_ANY, PORT})
connect(r0, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -> -1, EPROTO (self-connect)
listen(r0, backlog) -> 0
r1 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0)
connect(r1, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -> 0
accept(r0) -> -1, EPROTO (stale sk_err)
Basically, it creates a socket (r0) and triggers a self-connect after
binding it. This self-connect fails with EPROTO because it loops back
to r0 while the socket is still in the TCP_SYN_SENT state, causing it
to be incorrectly dispatched to the connecting-client path. The
unexpected packet type encountered there sets sk_err to EPROTO.
After that, it invokes a listen() call on the same socket. This
listen() call succeeds because the kernel's listening path never
inspects or clears sk_err. Then, a new socket (r1) is created as a
normal client and connects to r0. However, vsock_accept() rejects this
incoming connection because the listener's sk_err still holds the
EPROTO error from the earlier failed self-connect.
This rejection causes the child socket created for r1's connection to
never be freed on virtio or hyperv transports; only the VMCI transport
implements pending_work to revisit and clean up a rejected socket.
For a non-blocking connect(), vsock_connect() may return -EINPROGRESS
immediately, and vsock_connect_timeout() can later set sk->sk_err
asynchronously.
Since no vsock transport ever sets sk_err on a socket while it is in
TCP_LISTEN state, checking it in vsock_accept() serves no purpose and
only carries forward errors left behind by earlier, unrelated
connection attempts on the same socket. Remove the checks so accept()
no longer rejects valid incoming connections because of a stale
error, which also avoids the resource leak described above. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
software node: Fix software_node_get_reference_args() with index -1
The bounds check for the index passed to
software_node_get_reference_args() was failing when passed UINT_MAX,
this in turn would lead to an out of bound access in the property
array. Fix the bound check to also cover the UINT_MAX case. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| A remote denial of service vulnerability was found in the Linux kernel’s TIPC kernel module. The while loop in tipc_link_xmit() hits an unknown state while attempting to parse SKBs, which are not in the queue. Sending two small UDP packets to a system with a UDP bearer results in the CPU utilization for the system to instantly spike to 100%, causing a denial of service condition. |
| A slab-out-of-bound read problem was found in brcmf_get_assoc_ies in drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c in the Linux Kernel. This issue could occur when assoc_info->req_len data is bigger than the size of the buffer, defined as WL_EXTRA_BUF_MAX, leading to a denial of service. |
| A flaw use after free in the Linux kernel integrated infrared receiver/transceiver driver was found in the way user detaching rc device. A local user could use this flaw to crash the system or potentially escalate their privileges on the system. |
| An issue was discovered in fl_set_geneve_opt in net/sched/cls_flower.c in the Linux kernel before 6.3.7. It allows an out-of-bounds write in the flower classifier code via TCA_FLOWER_KEY_ENC_OPTS_GENEVE packets. This may result in denial of service or privilege escalation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in get_manuf_info()
get_manuf_info() reads le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size) bytes from the
device I2C EEPROM into a buffer allocated with kmalloc_obj(), which
is sizeof(struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor) = 10 bytes.
The Size field comes from the device and is only validated (in
check_i2c_image()) to make sure the descriptor fits within
TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE (16384 bytes), not against the destination buffer size.
A malicious USB device can therefore set Size to any value up to 16377,
causing a heap overflow of up to 16367 bytes when plugged into a host
running this driver.
valid_csum() is called after read_rom() and also iterates
buffer[0..Size-1], compounding the out-of-bounds access.
Fix by rejecting descriptors with unexpected length before calling
read_rom().
[ johan: amend commit message; also check for short descriptors ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: Reject login PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN
In drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c, isert_login_recv_done()
computes the login request payload length as wc->byte_len minus
ISER_HEADERS_LEN with no lower bound, and login_req_len is a signed int.
A remote iSER initiator can post a login Send work request carrying
fewer than ISER_HEADERS_LEN (76) bytes, so the subtraction underflows
and login_req_len becomes negative.
isert_rx_login_req() then reads that negative length back into a signed
int, takes size = min(rx_buflen, MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS), and because the
min() is signed it keeps the negative value; the value is then passed as
the memcpy() length and sign-extended to a multi-gigabyte size_t. The
copy into the 8192-byte login->req_buf runs far out of bounds and
faults, crashing the target node. The login phase precedes iSCSI
authentication, so no credentials are required to reach this path.
Reject any login PDU shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN before the
subtraction, mirroring the existing early return on a failed work
completion, so login_req_len can never go negative. The upper bound was
already safe: a posted login buffer cannot deliver more than
ISER_RX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, so the difference stays at or below
MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS and the existing min() clamps it; only the missing
lower bound needs to be added. |
