| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: Bound fragmented header copies by the remaining length
siw_get_hdr() can receive an extended DDP/RDMAP header across more than
one TCP callback. The first callback may receive most of the header,
while the next one still limits the copy to hdrlen - MIN_DDP_HDR instead
of the number of missing bytes. This makes the destination move past the
end of the header and overwrite the receive state, including
fpdu_part_rcvd. A later callback can then use a negative fpdu_part_rcvd
value as a copy offset, which creates an OOB write.
Use the number of header bytes already received when calculating the
next copy length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: libipw: reject too-short beacon and probe responses
libipw_process_probe_response() and the libipw_network_init() call it
makes assume the frame contains the full 36-byte beacon and probe
response prefix, but the ipw2100 and ipw2200 receive paths only
establish that a management frame carries the generic 24-byte
three-address header.
libipw_network_init() then computes the information element length as
stats->len - sizeof(*beacon)
stats->len is a u16 and sizeof() has type size_t, so the subtraction is
evaluated as size_t and wraps instead of going negative. Truncating
that to the u16 length parameter of libipw_parse_info_param() yields
65524 for a 24-byte beacon, and the parser then walks the receive
buffer as if it held almost 64 KiB of information elements, reading
past the allocation.
Reject the frame before any fixed field is touched.
Found by an AI-assisted review of length arithmetic in management frame
parsers. Verified with a KUnit case under Generic KASAN on arm64 under
QEMU; I do not have the hardware, so it is not tested on a real device. |
| The MetForm WordPress plugin before 4.3.1 does not sanitize or escape submitted form-field values before inserting them into the HTML body of its email notifications, allowing unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary markup into the administrator and submitter notification emails the site sends. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length
mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a
beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that
many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight
from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the
element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id
alone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted
RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up
to 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the
kmemdup()'d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe
response is processed during scan-result parsing.
Pass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk
to the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value
before any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or zero IE length cannot
underflow to a large size_t and defeat the bound.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). |
| An incorrect buffer size calculation vulnerability exists in tinyexpr commit 4a7456e in new_expr(). For arity-0 expression nodes, including constants, variables, and zero-argument functions, the function allocates less memory than sizeof(te_expr) but treats the returned allocation as a complete te_expr object. This results in undefined behavior and can cause deterministic process termination in UBSan-instrumented builds. |
| An issue in Mercusys AC12 V2 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via the UART serial interface on the printed circuit board (PCB) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix integer overflow in mr_check_range() leading to OOB access
mr_check_range() validates that [iova, iova+length) falls within the
registered MR range using wraparound-prone arithmetic:
if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova ||
iova + length > mr->ibmr.iova + mr->ibmr.length)
A remote peer can craft an RDMA-Write/Read RETH so that iova + length
wraps to 0 (e.g. iova=0xfffffffffffffff8, length=8), bypassing the
check. rxe_mr_iova_to_index() then computes a huge index (int idx, only
guarded by WARN_ON) and rxe_mr_copy_xarray() dereferences
mr->page_info[huge], causing an out-of-bounds read/write and a kernel
oops that is triggerable by an unauthenticated remote peer.
Rewrite the check in overflow-safe form; the first two clauses guarantee
that the subsequent subtractions do not underflow:
if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova ||
length > mr->ibmr.length ||
iova - mr->ibmr.iova > mr->ibmr.length - length)
With the fix, mr_check_range() returns -EINVAL for the crafted iova and
the responder reports REMOTE_ACCESS_ERROR instead of triggering the OOB. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: scpi: bound-check DVFS index in scpi_dvfs_recalc_rate
dvfs_get_idx() may return an out-of-range index if the SCP firmware is
buggy or returns a stale value. Only negative indexes were rejected, so a
large index walked past info->opps and could treat garbage as a clock rate
(KASAN OOB / wrong frequency to consumers). The missing upper bound dates
back to the original SCPI clock driver.
Treat indexes >= opp count as invalid and return 0, same as idx < 0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wilc1000: fix out-of-bounds read in P2P public action frames
wilc_wfi_p2p_rx() and mgmt_tx() start parsing a frame once
ieee80211_is_public_action() returns true. That helper only verifies the
frame is long enough for the action category field, that is
offsetofend(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u.action.category), 25 bytes. Both
functions then read the P2P public action header up to oui_subtype at
offset 30 and pass "size - ie_offset" to cfg80211_find_vendor_ie(), where
ie_offset is offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u) + sizeof(*d), i.e. 32.
A public action frame of 25 to 31 bytes passes the check but is shorter
than that 32 byte header, so oui_subtype can be read out of bounds, and
because the length is unsigned, "size - ie_offset" underflows to a value
close to 4 GiB. cfg80211_find_vendor_ie() takes an unsigned int length,
so even the size_t subtraction in mgmt_tx() is truncated to the same
value. It then walks far past the buffer searching for a vendor element
until it reaches unmapped memory.
In the receive path the frame arrives over the air and needs no
association, so a nearby unauthenticated device can crash the host while
it is in P2P listen. Reject frames shorter than the P2P public action
header in both paths before dereferencing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix next_buffer UAF and NextCommand bounds in compound PDUs
Fix several related bounds checking and pointer lifecycle issues in
receive_encrypted_standard()'s handling of compound encrypted frames:
- Clear next_buffer after assigning it to server->bigbuf. A stale
next_buffer pointer can lead to a use-after-free on subsequent
error paths.
- Update pdu_length to the decrypted plaintext size (buf_size). Using
the pre-decryption length allows NextCommand to point into stale
ciphertext residue.
- Reject next_cmd values smaller than MID_HEADER_SIZE(server).
- Fix an integer overflow in the upper bound check by verifying
pdu_length - next_cmd < MID_HEADER_SIZE(server), ensuring the
trailing slice is large enough for a header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: iptfs: fix stack OOB read in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk()
iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() advances to the fragment containing @offset
with an unbounded loop:
while (offset >= walk->past + walk->frags[walk->fragi].len)
walk->past += walk->frags[walk->fragi++].len;
walk->fragi is advanced and walk->frags[walk->fragi] is dereferenced
without ever checking fragi against walk->nr_frags. When the requested
offset is at or beyond the total length spanned by the walk's fragments,
fragi runs past nr_frags and off the end of the fixed-size on-stack
frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1] array, reading out-of-bounds stack memory.
The two callers behave differently: iptfs_skb_add_frags() already guards
against this with
if (!walk->nr_frags ||
offset >= walk->total + walk->initial_offset)
return len;
but iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() has no such guard and calls
iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() unconditionally, so it performs the
out-of-range walk. Its own "fragi < walk->nr_frags" bound check runs only
afterwards, too late to prevent the read.
This is reachable from the receive path: a crafted IP-TFS (AGGFRAG)
payload delivered to an IPTFS SA drives iptfs_reassem_cont() ->
iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() with an offset past the fragment total, e.g.:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888008ad7210 by task repro/345
iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:392
iptfs_skb_can_add_frags+0x155/0x310 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:420
iptfs_reassem_cont+0xcf8/0x1140 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:902
iptfs_input_ordered+0x552/0x670 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1280
iptfs_input+0x3d6/0xde0 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1741
xfrm_input+0x282f/0x6140 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c:700
xfrm4_esp_rcv+0x93/0x120 net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c:104
ip_rcv+0x278/0x2d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612
Give iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() the same up-front guard that
iptfs_skb_add_frags() already has, so the walk is never entered with an
out-of-range offset. When it triggers, the caller falls back to the
existing linearize-and-copy path, which is safe. |
| Buffer overflow in WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.97 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| There is an input injection in vCast exposed network services in ViewSonic ViewBoard that allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to inject arbitrary input into service endpoints via network-based HTTP requests to unauthenticated endpoints |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Avoid integer underflow in EOP ring size calculation.
The low 6 bits of cp_hqd_eop_control store the base-2 logarithm
of the EOP ring size. This was calculated as
order_base_2(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / 4) - 1
But order_base_2 can in theory return 0, so this could underflow
(although in practice the ring buffer size cannot be less than 4096).
Change this to
order_base_2(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / 8)
using properties of logarithms.
Also add to the above comment to make the mathematics more clear.
(cherry picked from commit f0f43fcf8b2b3a924cad9444340921c96ed5f634) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Avoid integer underflow with ffs in EOP ring size calc
The low 6 bits of cp_hqd_eop_control store the base-2 logarithm
of the EOP ring size. This was calculated as
ffs(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / sizeof(unsigned int)) - 1 - 1
But ffs can in theory return 1 or 0, so this could underflow
(although in practice the ring buffer size cannot be less than 4096).
Change this to
ffs(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / sizeof(unsigned int) / 4)
using properties of logarithms.
(cherry picked from commit 4f18c56630383c14bfc6b2d65f88f2f895d2121a) |
| Improper Neutralization of Null Byte or NUL Character vulnerability in the EventLogAppender of Apache log4net.
A NUL character in logged content ended the Windows Event Log record at that point, so everything the layout rendered after it, including exception text and trailing fields, was silently not stored. A party whose data reaches a log message could hide the rest of that record. Only applications on Windows that use EventLogAppender are affected.
This issue affects Apache log4net: from 1.2.9 before 3.5.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.5.0, which fixes the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: prevent authentication frame length truncation
mwifiex_cfg80211_authenticate() derives the authentication frame length
from req->ie_len and req->auth_data_len, both of type size_t, but stores
it in a u16.
NL80211_ATTR_AUTH_DATA only has a minimum length policy. Since nla_len is
a u16, a single attribute can carry up to 65531 bytes of payload, so the
sum can exceed U16_MAX before it is assigned to pkt_len. The truncated
pkt_len determines the skb frame area, while the copy length remains
req->auth_data_len - 4, resulting in a heap buffer overflow.
For example, with auth_data_len equal to 65510 and no IEs, the sum is
65546. It is truncated to 10 and then reduced by four to 6. The driver
appends only six bytes to the skb with skb_put(), but then copies 65506
user-provided bytes into the authentication body.
Reaching this path requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the user namespace owning
the network namespace, an up station netdev, and a suitable BSS/SAE
authentication request.
Compute the length in size_t, reject values that cannot be represented by
the firmware's u16 frame length field, and only then assign it to pkt_len. |
| GNU Aspell contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in ReadOnlyDict::load() in readonly_ws.cpp. When loading a binary .rws dictionary file, it uses offset fields from the file header as byte indices into a heap buffer without validating their bounds. An attacker can trigger this by convincing a user to run aspell with a crafted dictionary file supplied through --master, --dict-dir, or configuration options, leading to heap memory disclosure or a denial of service via application crash.
This issue was fixed in commit 941953b25031bc9104e83f58e138a664b8dedc3f which will be released in version 0.60.8.3. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: libertas_tf: fix UAF in lbtf_free_adapter()
lbtf_free_adapter() calls lbtf_free_cmd_buffer() to free the command
buffers before calling timer_delete_sync() to wait for the command
timer callback. If the timer callback (command_timer_fn) is already
running when lbtf_free_cmd_buffer() frees the command array, the
callback dereferences priv->cur_cmd->cmdbuf which points to freed
memory.
Swap the order so that timer_delete_sync() runs first, ensuring any
in-flight callback has completed before the command buffers are freed. |
| Microsoft UFO is an open-source framework for intelligent automation across devices and platforms. Prior to 3.0.9, the execute_command tool in ufo/client/mcp/http_servers/linux_mcp_server.py treats sort and uniq as read-only commands while the free-form command parameter can select their file-output forms. An authenticated caller can use sort -o or the optional second uniq operand to create or overwrite files writable by the UFO server process without shell metacharacters, because the allowed binary opens the destination itself and the argument policy does not reject the operation. This can corrupt configuration or other writable data and disrupt the service, but the demonstrated primitive does not directly disclose files or establish arbitrary code execution. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.9. |
