| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fprobe: Terminate the fgraph_data list when the reservation is not filled
fprobe_fgraph_entry() reserves shadow stack space for every fprobe with
an exit handler, but only fills it for those whose entry handler returns
0. fgraph_reserve_data() does not clear the area, so fprobe_return()
parses the unused tail as headers left over from an earlier call, and an
exit handler can run twice or despite its entry handler asking to skip
it.
Write a zero word after the last entry to terminate the walk. A zeroed
slot does not decode to a NULL fprobe on the arches that encode the
header into one unsigned long, since arch_decode_fprobe_header_fp() ORs
in FPROBE_HEADER_MSB_PATTERN, so make read_fprobe_header() return NULL
for a zeroed slot. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot's "WARNING in do_new_mount" saga
ntfs_create_inode() creates a new inode via ntfs_new_inode(). It hashes
it with insert_inode_locked() and so it's marked as I_NEW until
unlock_new_inode().
ntfs 3 calls d_instantiate() in between though... Since the dentry was
already hashed by the lookup before the create any path walk finds it
without touching the parent's i_rwsem and so can lock the inode.
If the inode is a directory unlock_new_inode() calls
lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() and marks i_rwsem with the
i_mutex_dir_key class.
That resets the count and the owner of a lock somebody else may already
hold by now...
syzbot has been spamming us with the same godforsaken bug
"WARNING in do_new_mount"
since 2023. I can't take it anymore so I went looking. Afaict, syzbot's
executor chdirs into a freshly mounted ntfs3 image, creates a
directory and then mounts some pseudofs on it. Everytime the mkdir()
takes longer than syzbot waits mount() runs concurrently:
mkdir("./sys") mount(NULL, "./sys", "sysfs")
ntfs_create_inode()
d_instantiate()
user_path_at() finds the dentry
do_lock_mount()
inode_lock(inode)
namespace_lock()
unlock_new_inode()
lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key()
init_rwsem(&inode->i_rwsem)
unlock_mount()
inode_unlock(inode)
The mount side then releases a lock that according to the rwsem nobody
holds:
DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && ...):
count = 0x0, magic = 0xffff888043a854e8, owner = 0x0,
curr 0xffff888000244880, list empty
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5346 at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1368 __up_write
Call Trace:
inode_unlock include/linux/fs.h:877 [inline]
unlock_mount fs/namespace.c:2892 [inline]
do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3828 [inline]
do_new_mount+0x777/0xa40 fs/namespace.c:3887
On PREEMPT_RT the same thing shows up as
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(rt_mutex_owner(lock) != current)
WARNING: kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h:193 at rt_mutex_slowunlock
The up_write() underflows the reset count. A following inode_lock() on
that directory then never returns. A path walk into the new directory
racing with the mkdir() corrupts the lock the same way via
inode_lock_shared() in lookup_slow().
Switch to d_instantiate_new() and drop the trailing unlock_new_inode().
All error paths bail out before that point with I_NEW still set and
keep using discard_new_inode().
May we never see this fscking bug report again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
workqueue: Fix NULL current_pwq deref in flush dependency check
check_flush_dependency() uses current_wq_worker() to determine whether
the caller is a workqueue worker and then dereferences worker->current_pwq
to test whether the current workqueue is WQ_MEM_RECLAIM.
current_wq_worker() only means that %current has PF_WQ_WORKER set. A
kworker can reach check_flush_dependency() while it is not executing a
work item. One such path is worker_thread() acting as the pool manager,
where create_worker() does GFP_KERNEL allocation and the allocation path
invokes the OOM notifier. In that state worker->current_pwq is NULL
because current_pwq is set only by process_one_work() and cleared again
after the work function returns.
[ 416.760634][ T375] Call trace:
[ 416.760638][ T375] check_flush_dependency+0x80/0x120 (P)
[ 416.760648][ T375] __flush_work+0x98/0x224
[ 416.760657][ T375] flush_work+0x30/0x44
[ 416.760665][ T375] ...
[ 416.760710][ T375] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0
[ 416.760719][ T375] out_of_memory+0xb4/0x458
[ 416.760730][ T375] __alloc_pages_may_oom+0x11c/0x1a8
[ 416.760739][ T375] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x314/0x46c
[ 416.760746][ T375] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x110/0x1a4
[ 416.760753][ T375] new_slab+0x12c/0x484
[ 416.760759][ T375] ___slab_alloc+0x7a8/0xc7c
[ 416.760765][ T375] __slab_alloc+0x74/0xd8
[ 416.760772][ T375] __kmalloc_cache_node_noprof+0x2ac/0x304
[ 416.760779][ T375] alloc_worker+0x28/0x60
[ 416.760785][ T375] create_worker+0x4c/0x20c
[ 416.760790][ T375] worker_thread+0xe8/0x2b8
[ 416.760796][ T375] kthread+0x1a8/0x200
[ 416.760805][ T375] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Guard the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM-worker warning with worker->current_pwq. If the
kworker is not currently executing a work item, there is no current
workqueue to diagnose with that warning. The PF_MEMALLOC warning is left
unchanged so explicit reclaim context flushing a !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM target
is still reported. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsl/fman: Fix clk reference leak in read_dts_node()
of_clk_get() returns a clock with its reference count incremented, but
read_dts_node() only uses it to read the rate and never calls clk_put().
The clock is not stored anywhere, so the reference cannot be released
later either.
Release the clock once its rate has been read, which also covers the
error path taken when the rate is zero. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipe: protect the dm-verity root hash with RCU
ipe_bdev_setintegrity() frees the old root hash when dm-verity publishes
a new one on ->preresume, while policy evaluation can still be
dereferencing it.
Protect the root hash with RCU. The evaluation path already runs under
rcu_read_lock().
[FW: remove model name according to latest guideline] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: do not let ipv6_find_hdr() return an offset past the packet end
ipv6_find_hdr() walks the extension header chain, skipping each header by
the length that header itself declares. ipv6_optlen() returns up to 2048,
and the skip is never checked against skb->len, so the offset stored in
*offset can point past the end of the packet.
openvswitch installs that offset as the transport header, and
update_ipv6_checksum() then reads and writes the transport checksum field
out of bounds:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in inet_proto_csum_replace16+0x445/0x470
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810b754b06 by task ovs_ipv6_oob/629
CPU: 4 UID: 1000 PID: 629 Comm: ovs_ipv6_oob Tainted: G N 7.3.0-rc3+ #348
Call Trace:
inet_proto_csum_replace16+0x445/0x470
set_ipv6_addr+0x3dd/0x460
do_execute_actions+0x6a3d/0x7c40
ovs_execute_actions+0xfd/0x480
ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xc38/0xf20
genl_rcv_msg+0x59e/0x870
netlink_rcv_skb+0x18b/0x450
genl_rcv+0x2d/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x6bc/0xa20
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810b754980
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704
The buggy address is located 390 bytes inside of
freed 704-byte region [ffff88810b754980, ffff88810b754c40)
Other callers use that offset too, so bound it here rather than in one
caller.
Reject a header whose declared length does not fit in the packet.
ipv6_find_hdr() already fails with -EBADMSG on a malformed chain, so this
adds no new failure mode. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/imagination: Propagate map failures correctly from pvr_mmu_map_sgl()
Map failure from pvr_mmu_map_sgl() interface was not returned correctly
to pvr_mmu_map() interface. This resulted in pvr_mmu_map() interface to
continue instead of returning an error to caller.
Fix it by returning a proper error code from pvr_mmu_map_sgl() interface.
Call stack for crash:
[ 1179.286237] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008
[ 1179.295067] Mem abort info:
[ 1179.297877] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 1179.301656] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1179.306987] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1179.310048] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1179.313198] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 1179.318096] Data abort info:
[ 1179.320993] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 1179.326483] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 1179.331546] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 1179.336895] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000009822a000
[ 1179.343402] [0000000000000008] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
[ 1179.350243] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#2] SMP
[ 1179.355908] Modules linked in: powervr gpu_sched drm_shmem_helper drm_gpuvm drm_exec xhci_plat_hcd xhci_hcd dwc3 usbcore usb_common snd_soc_simple_card snd_soc_simple_card_utils dwc3_am62 at24 sa2ul sha512 libsha512 sha256 authenc sch_fq_codel fuse dm_mod ipv6
[ 1179.378992] CPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 680 Comm: deqp-vk Tainted: G D 6.17.0 #1 PREEMPT
[ 1179.388120] Tainted: [D]=DIE
[ 1179.390994] Hardware name: Texas Instruments AM625 SK (DT)
[ 1179.396467] pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 1179.403415] pc : pvr_mmu_op_context_unmap_curr_page+0x6c/0x134 [powervr]
[ 1179.410140] lr : pvr_mmu_op_context_unmap_curr_page+0x58/0x134 [powervr]
[ 1179.416848] sp : ffff8000839ab8c0
[ 1179.420153] x29: ffff8000839ab8c0 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 000000008f386000
[ 1179.427283] x26: ffff000016d1df98 x25: 0000000000247000 x24: 00000000000001e6
[ 1179.434413] x23: 0000000000000002 x22: 000000000000ffff x21: 0000000000000247
[ 1179.441540] x20: 0000000000000245 x19: ffff000016d1df60 x18: 0000000000000002
[ 1179.448668] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000001
[ 1179.455793] x14: 0000000000060810 x13: ffff80007fffffff x12: ffff000004190480
[ 1179.462921] x11: ffff8000853f7000 x10: ffff8000811ae000 x9 : ffff0000041900b8
[ 1179.470051] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 00000000990c4001 x6 : 0000000000000007
[ 1179.477177] x5 : ffff000016d1df60 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff00000a7d8000
[ 1179.484306] x2 : 00000000000001ff x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 1179.491433] Call trace:
[ 1179.493872] pvr_mmu_op_context_unmap_curr_page+0x6c/0x134 [powervr] (P)
[ 1179.500582] pvr_mmu_map+0x31c/0x388 [powervr]
[ 1179.505027] pvr_vm_gpuva_map+0x40/0x88 [powervr]
[ 1179.509732] __drm_gpuvm_sm_map+0x250/0x44c [drm_gpuvm]
[ 1179.514952] drm_gpuvm_sm_map+0x48/0x5c [drm_gpuvm]
[ 1179.519822] pvr_vm_bind_op_exec+0x64/0x70 [powervr]
[ 1179.524785] pvr_vm_map+0x1f8/0x2a8 [powervr]
[ 1179.529142] pvr_ioctl_vm_map+0x12c/0x188 [powervr]
[ 1179.534018] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xb8/0x128
[ 1179.537941] drm_ioctl+0x21c/0x4ec
[ 1179.541337] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x108
[ 1179.545344] invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100
[ 1179.549091] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
[ 1179.553790] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[ 1179.557106] el0_svc+0x34/0xf0
[ 1179.560159] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xd0/0xe4
[ 1179.564334] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
[ 1179.567996] Code: 54000300 35000360 f9402261 79409a62 (f9400421)
[ 1179.574081] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: fix incorrect RCU teardown order
i915_gem_busy_ioctl uses dma_resv_for_each_fence_unlocked() to iterate
over the fences in an GEM object without holding a reference but only
the RCU read side lock.
What can happen here is that the GEM object is destroyed concurrently
while i915_gem_busy_ioctl is still running. This won't free the GEM
objects memory, but still drops all the dma_fence references.
Now when dma_resv_for_each_fence_unlocked() sees a destroyed dma_fence it
assumes that a new fence list was installed and re-starts the loop.
But in the case of a destroyed GEM object a new fence list is never
installed, only the old one freed and therefore the iteration never
finishes resulting in an endless loop.
The solution is to drop the fence references only after the RCU grace
period.
The fixes tag is not necessary the patch introducing the problem, but the
one making it so worse that we need to address it.
This problem was pointed out by Sashiko-bot.
(cherry picked from commit 5113479556025093bf8133bb2dcaa33be2d50921) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau/uvmm: fix UAF in nouveau_uvmm_sm when BO is in TTM_PL_SYSTEM
nouveau_uvmm_sm() calls op_map(), which passes bo->resource through
nouveau_mem() to nouveau_uvma_map(). nouveau_uvmm_vmm_map() then reads
mem->mem.type.
But this is only valid when bo->resource is backed by struct nouveau_mem,
as is the case for VRAM and TT resources. If the BO is left in
TTM_PL_SYSTEM, bo->resource is only a struct ttm_resource. Treating it
as struct nouveau_mem makes the mem->mem.type read past the end of the
resource, causing a KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in nouveau_uvmm_sm
report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nouveau_uvmm_vmm_map drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c:152 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nouveau_uvma_map drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c:199 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in op_map drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c:849 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nouveau_uvmm_sm.constprop.0+0x6ab/0x900 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c:903
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888127d3e3a0 by task kworker/0:1/11
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 7.2.0 #5 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: nouveau_sched_wq_2224 drm_sched_run_job_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x95/0xe0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xcb/0x5a0 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xca/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:595
nouveau_uvmm_vmm_map drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c:152 [inline]
nouveau_uvma_map drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c:199 [inline]
op_map drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c:849 [inline]
nouveau_uvmm_sm.constprop.0+0x6ab/0x900 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c:903
nouveau_uvmm_sm_unmap drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c:932 [inline]
nouveau_uvmm_bind_job_run+0xd6/0x250 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c:1532
nouveau_job_run drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_sched.c:350 [inline]
nouveau_sched_run_job+0x62/0xd0 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_sched.c:364
drm_sched_run_job_work+0x356/0xa10 drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c:1061
process_one_work+0x8a5/0x1900 kernel/workqueue.c:3322
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3405 [inline]
worker_thread+0x5dd/0xd80 kernel/workqueue.c:3486
kthread+0x31d/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x662/0x940 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
Allocated by task 2224 on cpu 0 at 66.550027s:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:57
kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:78
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5334 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x304/0x7c0 mm/slub.c:5359
_kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:992 [inline]
dma_resv_list_alloc+0x27/0x90 drivers/dma-buf/dma-resv.c:106
dma_resv_reserve_fences+0x60e/0xa30 drivers/dma-buf/dma-resv.c:205
ttm_bo_alloc_resource+0x12c/0xbd0 drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:721
ttm_bo_validate+0x1bc/0x4a0 drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:856
ttm_bo_init_reserved+0x2c3/0x570 drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:970
nouveau_bo_init+0x159/0x2c0 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_bo.c:359
nouveau_gem_new+0x234/0x5f0 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c:272
nouveau_gem_ioctl_new+0x1eb/0x420 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c:352
drm_ioctl_kernel+0x192/0x350 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:817
drm_ioctl+0x4f8/0xb40 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:914
nouveau_drm_ioctl+0xea/0x2c0 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_drm.c:1338
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x180/0x1d0 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 ar
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau: Fix bridge reference leak in nv1a_ram_new()
pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot() takes a reference to the PCI device,
which is never released once the memory size has been read from its
config space. Drop the reference before returning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau: Fix runtime PM leak in nouveau_connector_detect()
If nvif_outp_edid_get() fails, nouveau_connector_detect() returns
early without dropping the runtime PM reference taken at the start
of the function, keeping the device powered on until the next
successful detect.
Balance the reference on the error path like the other exit paths
do. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau: RCU-free the scheduler-containing nouveau_sched
struct nouveau_sched embeds a struct drm_gpu_scheduler (base).
nouveau_sched_destroy() calls nouveau_sched_fini() (which does
drm_sched_fini(&sched->base)) and then frees the object with plain
kfree(sched).
drm_sched_fence_get_timeline_name() returns fence->sched->name, and the
scheduler fence keeps a .release callback so it is not ops-detached on
signalling. A finished fence exported to userspace via drm_syncobj /
sync_file therefore keeps pointing at &sched->base after nouveau_sched_destroy(),
and a later get_timeline_name() -- reachable unprivileged through
SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO -- dereferences freed memory (KASAN slab-use-after-free
read).
Per the dma-fence lifetime contract the exporter must keep the data backing a
signalled fence alive for an RCU grace period. Free the scheduler-containing
object with kfree_rcu() instead of kfree(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau: don't bump pin count on failed re-pin in nouveau_bo_pin_locked()
nouveau_bo_pin_locked() checks whether an already pinned BO is in a
memory domain compatible with a new pin request. When the domains are
incompatible, it sets -EBUSY but still calls ttm_bo_pin() before
returning.
Callers treat a failed nouveau_bo_pin() as not having acquired a new pin,
so the extra pin count is never decreased by a matching unpin.
This triggers the warning in ttm_bo_release():
WARN_ON_ONCE(bo->pin_count);
Found when fuzzing the nouveau driver with a modified Syzkaller:
WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:256 at ttm_bo_release+0x827/0x9e0 drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:256, CPU#1: syz.3.24/2212
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2212 Comm: syz.3.24 Not tainted 7.2.0 #24 PREEMPT(lazy)
nouveau 0000:01:00.0: gsp:msg fn:103 len:0x40/0x20 res:0x19 resp:0x19
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ttm_bo_release+0x827/0x9e0 drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:256
Code: 02 00 0f 85 51 01 00 00 48 8b 7b 08 e8 d2 20 01 00 e9 80 fd ff ff e8 d8 15 c0 fe 90 0f 0b 90 e9 e1 f8 ff ff e8 ca 15 c0 fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 a4 f8 ff ff e8 bc 15 c0 fe be 03 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8
msg: 00000000: 05 00 d0 c1 04 00 f0 f1 01 30 00 00 2d 90 00 00 .........0..-...
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000f5cf710 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888018e5d2a8 RCX: ffffffff82bb1b36
RDX: ffff888017b68000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888018e5d2a8
msg: 00000010: 19 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
RBP: ffff88801261c720 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10031cba55
R10: ffff888018e5d2ab R11: 00000000000000f3 R12: ffff888018e5d290
R13: ffff888018e5d2d4 R14: ffff88801b219c18 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880e0f6f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b31223ffc CR3: 0000000028e00005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 80000000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
ttm_bo_put drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:325 [inline]
ttm_bo_fini+0x55/0x80 drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:330
nouveau_gem_object_del+0xb2/0x1b0 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c:90
drm_gem_object_free+0x5f/0x90 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c:1165
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
__drm_gem_object_put include/drm/drm_gem.h:562 [inline]
drm_gem_object_put include/drm/drm_gem.h:575 [inline]
nouveau_abi16_chan_fini.constprop.0+0x44f/0x5a0 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_abi16.c:195
nouveau 0000:01:00.0: syz.2.23[2209]: Unknown handle 0x00000000
nouveau_abi16_fini+0x1d0/0x340 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_abi16.c:225
nouveau_drm_postclose+0x18b/0x3e0 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_drm.c:1284
nouveau 0000:01:00.0: syz.2.23[2209]: validate_init
drm_file_free.part.0+0x6d6/0xb60 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c:267
drm_file_free drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c:237 [inline]
drm_close_helper.isra.0+0x11a/0x160 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c:290
drm_release+0x1ab/0x330 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c:438
__fput+0x39c/0xa60 fs/file_table.c:512
nouveau 0000:01:00.0: syz.2.23[2209]: validate: -2
task_work_run+0x15a/0x230 kernel/task_work.c:233
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline]
do_exit+0x82b/0x25a0 kernel/exit.c:1009
do_group_exit+0xc2/0x280 kernel/exit.c:1152
get_signal+0x1d6e/0x1f30 kernel/signal.c:3046
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x7d/0x6e0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
__exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:66 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xdf/0x440 kernel/entry/common.c:101
__exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:207 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:230 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:318 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x4f8/0x690 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RI
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: fix NULL pointer dereference on fence allocation failure
virtio_gpu_fence_alloc() can fail due to memory pressure and return NULL,
but its caller like virtio_gpu_init_submit() never checks it. Later,
virtio_gpu_init_submit() passes the NULL fence to
virtio_gpu_fence_event_create(), which unconditionally dereferences it.
Found when fuzzing the virtio driver with Syzkaller:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000012: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000090-0x0000000000000097]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9991 Comm: syz.0.121 Not tainted 7.2.0 #4 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:virtio_gpu_fence_event_create drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_submit.c:295 [inline]
RIP: 0010:virtio_gpu_init_submit drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_submit.c:398 [inline]
RIP: 0010:virtio_gpu_execbuffer_ioctl+0xc78/0x1aa0 drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_submit.c:505
Code: 85 ed 0f 85 21 09 00 00 e8 05 5a c9 fb 48 8b 44 24 10 48 8d b8 90 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 9a 0d 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 4c 89 b0 90 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc900039dfad0 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffc900039dfdd8 RCX: ffffffff85f6fd3d
RDX: 0000000000000012 RSI: ffffffff85f6fd4b RDI: 0000000000000090
RBP: 0000000000000000 R0virtio_gpu_virgl_process_cmd: ctrl 0x102, error 0x1203
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880132c4000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888073b6c700 R15: 000000000000003b
FS: 00007fab480b96c0(0000) GS:ffff8880eb6e9000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007effbf5e55a8 CR3: 0000000048d19000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1f4/0x3e0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:817
drm_ioctl+0x5f4/0xc70 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:914
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fab471a82bd
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fab480b9018 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fab47435fa0 RCX: 00007fab471a82bd
RDX: 00002000000000c0 RSI: 00000000c0406442 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fab480b9080 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00007fab47436038 R14: 00007fab47435fa0 R15: 00007ffe85ab0740
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:virtio_gpu_fence_event_create drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_submit.c:295 [inline]
RIP: 0010:virtio_gpu_init_submit drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_submit.c:398 [inline]
RIP: 0010:virtio_gpu_execbuffer_ioctl+0xc78/0x1aa0 drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_submit.c:505
Code: 85 ed 0f 85 21 09 00 00 e8 05 5a c9 fb 48 8b 44 24 10 48 8d b8 90 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 9a 0d 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 4c 89 b0 90 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc900039dfad0 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffc900039dfdd8 RCX: ffffffff85f6fd3d
RDX: 0000000000000012 RSI: ffffffff85f6fd4b RDI: 0000000000000090
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880132c4000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888073b6c700 R15: 000000000000003b
FS: 00007fab480b96c0(0000) GS:ffff888098ae9000(0000) knlGS:00000000
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/vaddr: avoid hw-driven pte updates during damon_hugetlb_mkold()
damon_hugetlb_mkold() reads the page table entry into a local variable,
unsets the accessed bit in the variable, and updates the page table entry
with the updated variable value. If hardware updates the same page table
entry in parallel, the hw updates could be lost. For example,
hardware-updated dirty bits might be lost.
Avoid the parallel updates by clearing the page table entry when reading
it together, using huge_ptep_get_and_clear(). If a parallel write to the
memory is made after the clearing, the hw will see the page table entry is
cleared, trigger page fault and wait until it is handled. The page fault
handling will wait for damon_hugetlb_mkold() due to the page table lock.
Because hugetlbfs is an in-memory file system and hugetlb pages cannot be
reclaimed, no critical issue is expected to my best knowledge. But
definitely this is a nasty bug that should be fixed sooner rather than
later.
The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: of_property: Omit bus properties without a subordinate bus
A bridge (a device with a Type 1 header) may not have a secondary bus
allocated (pdev->subordinate), e.g., if there are no available bus numbers
or the bridge secondary/subordinate bus numbers are not writable.
The dynamic OF helpers of_pci_prop_bus_range() and of_pci_prop_intr_map()
dereference pdev->subordinate without checking it. When
CONFIG_PCI_DYNAMIC_OF_NODES is enabled, this can cause a NULL pointer
dereference and early boot hang.
Generate 'bus-range' and 'interrupt-map' properties only when a subordinate
bus exists. Keep the node and its remaining properties for bridges without
one.
The problem was latent since 407d1a51921e ("PCI: Create device tree node
for bridge"), but wasn't reachable until 1f340724419e ("PCI: of: Create
device tree PCI host bridge node"), which appeared in v6.15. Before
1f340724419e, of_pci_make_dev_node() returned early because the parent OF
node was missing.
[bhelgaas: move pdev->subordinate test to callees, commit log] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: alps: unregister DualPoint Stick input device on remove
alps_input_configured() allocates a second input device ("DualPoint
Stick") with input_allocate_device() and registers it, but the
alps_driver struct has no .remove handler and input2 is not tracked in
hdev->inputs. The default remove path (hid_hw_stop -> hidinput_disconnect)
only iterates hdev->inputs, so input2 is never unregistered and leaks
on every device removal.
Add a .remove handler that stops the device first (preventing URB
callbacks from touching input2 during teardown) and then unregisters
input2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: alps: fix use-after-free on input2 registration failure
alps_input_configured() stores data->input2 before calling
input_register_device(). If registration fails, input_free_device()
frees the input device but data->input2 still points to the freed memory.
alps_input_configured() calls hid_hw_open() before allocating input2, so
URBs are already active and raw_event can fire during the failure window.
A U1_SP_ABSOLUTE_REPORT_ID report arriving then causes u1_raw_event()
to dereference the freed data->input2 -> use-after-free.
Fix by only storing input2 into drvdata after successful registration
and adding a NULL guard in the raw_event path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Fix NULL pmu_ctx passed to pmu->sched_task()
perf_pmu_sched_task() returns early when cpuctx->task_ctx is set, and
cpc->task_epc is only non-NULL while a task context is scheduled in on
this CPU. __perf_pmu_sched_task() therefore always passes NULL:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00
pc : armv8pmu_sched_task+0x14/0x50
Call trace:
armv8pmu_sched_task+0x14/0x50 (P)
perf_pmu_sched_task+0xac/0x108
__perf_event_task_sched_out+0x6c/0xe0
Pass &cpc->epc instead, the CPU-wide context for this PMU, which the
function already dereferences a few lines up to find pmu.
armv8pmu_sched_task() is the only in-tree implementation that
dereferences the argument, and it only reads ->pmu, so the oops needs
BRBE, added in v6.17. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/pci: Fix missing device lock in zpci_report_status()
When pdev is non-NULL, zpci_report_status() accesses the device's driver.
To get a consistent state matching the recovery, the device lock needs to
be held. Do so by expanding the existing device lock critical section.
The lock only needs to be held when the pdev is non-NULL, so extract
the pdev-specific reporting into a helper function which also adds a
lockdep assertion to detect calls without the device lock held. |
