| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: plug races between subflow fail and subflow creation
We have races similar to the one addressed by the previous patch between
subflow failing and additional subflow creation. They are just harder to
trigger.
The solution is similar. Use a separate flag to track the condition
'socket state prevent any additional subflow creation' protected by the
fallback lock.
The socket fallback makes such flag true, and also receiving or sending
an MP_FAIL option.
The field 'allow_infinite_fallback' is now always touched under the
relevant lock, we can drop the ONCE annotation on write. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: axp20x_adc: Add missing sentinel to AXP717 ADC channel maps
The AXP717 ADC channel maps is missing a sentinel entry at the end. This
causes a KASAN warning.
Add the missing sentinel entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Add down_write(trace_event_sem) when adding trace event
When a module is loaded, it adds trace events defined by the module. It
may also need to modify the modules trace printk formats to replace enum
names with their values.
If two modules are loaded at the same time, the adding of the event to the
ftrace_events list can corrupt the walking of the list in the code that is
modifying the printk format strings and crash the kernel.
The addition of the event should take the trace_event_sem for write while
it adds the new event.
Also add a lockdep_assert_held() on that semaphore in
__trace_add_event_dirs() as it iterates the list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix oops due to non-existence of prealloc backlog struct
If an AF_RXRPC service socket is opened and bound, but calls are
preallocated, then rxrpc_alloc_incoming_call() will oops because the
rxrpc_backlog struct doesn't get allocated until the first preallocation is
made.
Fix this by returning NULL from rxrpc_alloc_incoming_call() if there is no
backlog struct. This will cause the incoming call to be aborted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: prevent A-MSDU attacks in mesh networks
This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability
for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in
response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can
be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks.
This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU
by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard
MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if
the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If
equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt.
This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that
uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses
are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e.,
when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs
was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and
12-byte Mesh Address Extension field.
It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh
networks keep being detected and prevented.
Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being
implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the
following IEEE 802.11 presentation:
https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdf
https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-protection.docx |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/sev: Use TSC_FACTOR for Secure TSC frequency calculation
When using Secure TSC, the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR reports a frequency based on
the nominal P0 frequency, which deviates slightly (typically ~0.2%) from
the actual mean TSC frequency due to clocking parameters.
Over extended VM uptime, this discrepancy accumulates, causing clock skew
between the hypervisor and a SEV-SNP VM, leading to early timer interrupts as
perceived by the guest.
The guest kernel relies on the reported nominal frequency for TSC-based
timekeeping, while the actual frequency set during SNP_LAUNCH_START may
differ. This mismatch results in inaccurate time calculations, causing the
guest to perceive hrtimers as firing earlier than expected.
Utilize the TSC_FACTOR from the SEV firmware's secrets page (see "Secrets
Page Format" in the SNP Firmware ABI Specification) to calculate the mean
TSC frequency, ensuring accurate timekeeping and mitigating clock skew in
SEV-SNP VMs.
Use early_ioremap_encrypted() to map the secrets page as
ioremap_encrypted() uses kmalloc() which is not available during early TSC
initialization and causes a panic.
[ bp: Drop the silly dummy var:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250630192726.GBaGLlHl84xIopx4Pt@fat_crate.local ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: discard erroneous disassoc frames on STA interface
When operating in concurrent STA/AP mode with host MLME enabled,
the firmware incorrectly sends disassociation frames to the STA
interface when clients disconnect from the AP interface.
This causes kernel warnings as the STA interface processes
disconnect events that don't apply to it:
[ 1303.240540] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 513 at net/wireless/mlme.c:141 cfg80211_process_disassoc+0x78/0xec [cfg80211]
[ 1303.250861] Modules linked in: 8021q garp stp mrp llc rfcomm bnep btnxpuart nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 onboard_us
[ 1303.327651] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 513 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1+ #3 PREEMPT
[ 1303.335937] Hardware name: Toradex Verdin AM62 WB on Verdin Development Board (DT)
[ 1303.343588] Workqueue: MWIFIEX_RX_WORK_QUEUE mwifiex_rx_work_queue [mwifiex]
[ 1303.350856] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 1303.357904] pc : cfg80211_process_disassoc+0x78/0xec [cfg80211]
[ 1303.364065] lr : cfg80211_process_disassoc+0x70/0xec [cfg80211]
[ 1303.370221] sp : ffff800083053be0
[ 1303.373590] x29: ffff800083053be0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 1303.380855] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 00000000ffffffff x24: ffff000002c5b8ae
[ 1303.388120] x23: ffff000002c5b884 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: 0000000000000008
[ 1303.395382] x20: ffff000002c5b8ae x19: ffff0000064dd408 x18: 0000000000000006
[ 1303.402646] x17: 3a36333a61623a30 x16: 32206d6f72662063 x15: ffff800080bfe048
[ 1303.409910] x14: ffff000003625300 x13: 0000000000000001 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1303.417173] x11: 0000000000000002 x10: ffff000003958600 x9 : ffff000003625300
[ 1303.424434] x8 : ffff00003fd9ef40 x7 : ffff0000039fc280 x6 : 0000000000000002
[ 1303.431695] x5 : ffff0000038976d4 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000003186
[ 1303.438956] x2 : 000000004836ba20 x1 : 0000000000006986 x0 : 00000000d00479de
[ 1303.446221] Call trace:
[ 1303.448722] cfg80211_process_disassoc+0x78/0xec [cfg80211] (P)
[ 1303.454894] cfg80211_rx_mlme_mgmt+0x64/0xf8 [cfg80211]
[ 1303.460362] mwifiex_process_mgmt_packet+0x1ec/0x460 [mwifiex]
[ 1303.466380] mwifiex_process_sta_rx_packet+0x1bc/0x2a0 [mwifiex]
[ 1303.472573] mwifiex_handle_rx_packet+0xb4/0x13c [mwifiex]
[ 1303.478243] mwifiex_rx_work_queue+0x158/0x198 [mwifiex]
[ 1303.483734] process_one_work+0x14c/0x28c
[ 1303.487845] worker_thread+0x2cc/0x3d4
[ 1303.491680] kthread+0x12c/0x208
[ 1303.495014] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Add validation in the STA receive path to verify that disassoc/deauth
frames originate from the connected AP. Frames that fail this check
are discarded early, preventing them from reaching the MLME layer and
triggering WARN_ON().
This filtering logic is similar with that used in the
ieee80211_rx_mgmt_disassoc() function in mac80211, which drops
disassoc frames that don't match the current BSSID
(!ether_addr_equal(mgmt->bssid, sdata->vif.cfg.ap_addr)), ensuring
only relevant frames are processed.
Tested on:
- 8997 with FW 16.68.1.p197 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns
What we want is to verify there is that clone won't expose something
hidden by a mount we wouldn't be able to undo. "Wouldn't be able to undo"
may be a result of MNT_LOCKED on a child, but it may also come from
lacking admin rights in the userns of the namespace mount belongs to.
clone_private_mnt() checks the former, but not the latter.
There's a number of rather confusing CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in various
userns during the mount, especially with the new mount API; they serve
different purposes and in case of clone_private_mnt() they usually,
but not always end up covering the missing check mentioned above. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts
Ensure that propagation settings can only be changed for mounts located
in the caller's mount namespace. This change aligns permission checking
with the rest of mount(2). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: core: ensure the allocated report buffer can contain the reserved report ID
When the report ID is not used, the low level transport drivers expect
the first byte to be 0. However, currently the allocated buffer not
account for that extra byte, meaning that instead of having 8 guaranteed
bytes for implement to be working, we only have 7. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soundwire: Revert "soundwire: qcom: Add set_channel_map api support"
This reverts commit 7796c97df6b1b2206681a07f3c80f6023a6593d5.
This patch broke Dragonboard 845c (sdm845). I see:
Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
Internal error: BRK handler: 00000000f20003e8 [#1] SMP
pc : qcom_swrm_set_channel_map+0x7c/0x80 [soundwire_qcom]
lr : snd_soc_dai_set_channel_map+0x34/0x78
Call trace:
qcom_swrm_set_channel_map+0x7c/0x80 [soundwire_qcom] (P)
sdm845_dai_init+0x18c/0x2e0 [snd_soc_sdm845]
snd_soc_link_init+0x28/0x6c
snd_soc_bind_card+0x5f4/0xb0c
snd_soc_register_card+0x148/0x1a4
devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x50/0xb0
sdm845_snd_platform_probe+0x124/0x148 [snd_soc_sdm845]
platform_probe+0x6c/0xd0
really_probe+0xc0/0x2a4
__driver_probe_device+0x7c/0x130
driver_probe_device+0x40/0x118
__device_attach_driver+0xc4/0x108
bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xf0
__device_attach+0xa4/0x198
device_initial_probe+0x18/0x28
bus_probe_device+0xb8/0xbc
deferred_probe_work_func+0xac/0xfc
process_one_work+0x244/0x658
worker_thread+0x1b4/0x360
kthread+0x148/0x228
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Kernel panic - not syncing: BRK handler: Fatal exception
Dan has also reported following issues with the original patch
https://lore.kernel.org/all/33fe8fe7-719a-405a-9ed2-d9f816ce1d57@sabinyo.mountain/
Bug #1:
The zeroeth element of ctrl->pconfig[] is supposed to be unused. We
start counting at 1. However this code sets ctrl->pconfig[0].ch_mask = 128.
Bug #2:
There are SLIM_MAX_TX_PORTS (16) elements in tx_ch[] array but only
QCOM_SDW_MAX_PORTS + 1 (15) in the ctrl->pconfig[] array so it corrupts
memory like Yongqin Liu pointed out.
Bug 3:
Like Jie Gan pointed out, it erases all the tx information with the rx
information. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/msg_ring: ensure io_kiocb freeing is deferred for RCU
syzbot reports that defer/local task_work adding via msg_ring can hit
a request that has been freed:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 19356 Comm: iou-wrk-19354 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4-syzkaller-00108-g17bbde2e1716 #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline]
print_report+0xd2/0x2b0 mm/kasan/report.c:521
kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:634
io_req_local_work_add io_uring/io_uring.c:1184 [inline]
__io_req_task_work_add+0x589/0x950 io_uring/io_uring.c:1252
io_msg_remote_post io_uring/msg_ring.c:103 [inline]
io_msg_data_remote io_uring/msg_ring.c:133 [inline]
__io_msg_ring_data+0x820/0xaa0 io_uring/msg_ring.c:151
io_msg_ring_data io_uring/msg_ring.c:173 [inline]
io_msg_ring+0x134/0xa00 io_uring/msg_ring.c:314
__io_issue_sqe+0x17e/0x4b0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1739
io_issue_sqe+0x165/0xfd0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1762
io_wq_submit_work+0x6e9/0xb90 io_uring/io_uring.c:1874
io_worker_handle_work+0x7cd/0x1180 io_uring/io-wq.c:642
io_wq_worker+0x42f/0xeb0 io_uring/io-wq.c:696
ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
which is supposed to be safe with how requests are allocated. But msg
ring requests alloc and free on their own, and hence must defer freeing
to a sane time.
Add an rcu_head and use kfree_rcu() in both spots where requests are
freed. Only the one in io_msg_tw_complete() is strictly required as it
has been visible on the other ring, but use it consistently in the other
spot as well.
This should not cause any other issues outside of KASAN rightfully
complaining about it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: vector: Fix context save/restore with xtheadvector
Previously only v0-v7 were correctly saved/restored,
and the context of v8-v31 are damanged.
Correctly save/restore v8-v31 to avoid breaking userspace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for __access_ok()"
This reverts commit ad5643cf2f69 ("riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for
__access_ok()").
This commit changes TASK_SIZE_MAX to be LONG_MAX to optimize access_ok(),
because the previous TASK_SIZE_MAX (default to TASK_SIZE) requires some
computation.
The reasoning was that all user addresses are less than LONG_MAX, and all
kernel addresses are greater than LONG_MAX. Therefore access_ok() can
filter kernel addresses.
Addresses between TASK_SIZE and LONG_MAX are not valid user addresses, but
access_ok() let them pass. That was thought to be okay, because they are
not valid addresses at hardware level.
Unfortunately, one case is missed: get_user_pages_fast() happily accepts
addresses between TASK_SIZE and LONG_MAX. futex(), for instance, uses
get_user_pages_fast(). This causes the problem reported by Robert [1].
Therefore, revert this commit. TASK_SIZE_MAX is changed to the default:
TASK_SIZE.
This unfortunately reduces performance, because TASK_SIZE is more expensive
to compute compared to LONG_MAX. But correctness first, we can think about
optimization later, if required. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: nfsd4_spo_must_allow() must check this is a v4 compound request
If the request being processed is not a v4 compound request, then
examining the cstate can have undefined results.
This patch adds a check that the rpc procedure being executed
(rq_procinfo) is the NFSPROC4_COMPOUND procedure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix sample vs do_exit()
Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a
synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access
MMIO in bad ways.
The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in
exit_mmap()'s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address
space it is trying to access.
It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a
receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for
various reasons.
Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit().
Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER
to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes
sure to set current->mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual
teardown). Such that CPU wide events don't trip on this same problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio-net: xsk: rx: fix the frame's length check
When calling buf_to_xdp, the len argument is the frame data's length
without virtio header's length (vi->hdr_len). We check that len with
xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len
to ensure the provided len does not larger than the allocated chunk
size. The additional vi->hdr_len is because in virtnet_add_recvbuf_xsk,
we use part of XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM for virtio header and ask the vhost
to start placing data from
hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM - vi->hdr_len
not
hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM
But the first buffer has virtio_header, so the maximum frame's length in
the first buffer can only be
xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size()
not
xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len
like in the current check.
This commit adds an additional argument to buf_to_xdp differentiate
between the first buffer and other ones to correctly calculate the maximum
frame's length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix warning when reconnecting channel
When reconnecting a channel in smb2_reconnect_server(), a dummy tcon
is passed down to smb2_reconnect() with ->query_interface
uninitialized, so we can't call queue_delayed_work() on it.
Fix the following warning by ensuring that we're queueing the delayed
worker from correct tcon.
WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 1126 at kernel/workqueue.c:2498 __queue_delayed_work+0x1d2/0x200
Modules linked in: cifs cifs_arc4 nls_ucs2_utils cifs_md4 [last unloaded: cifs]
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1126 Comm: kworker/4:0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #5 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-4.fc42 04/01/2014
Workqueue: cifsiod smb2_reconnect_server [cifs]
RIP: 0010:__queue_delayed_work+0x1d2/0x200
Code: 41 5e 41 5f e9 7f ee ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 e9 5d ff ff ff bf 02 00
00 00 e8 6c f3 07 00 89 c3 eb bd 90 0f 0b 90 e9 57 f> 0b 90 e9 65 fe
ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 e9 72 fe ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 e9
RSP: 0018:ffffc900014afad8 EFLAGS: 00010003
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888124d99988 RCX: ffffffff81399cc1
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffff888114326e00 RDI: ffff888124d999f0
RBP: 000000000000ea60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10249b3331
R10: ffff888124d9998f R11: 0000000000000004 R12: 0000000000000040
R13: ffff888114326e00 R14: ffff888124d999d8 R15: ffff888114939020
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88829f7fe000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffe7a2b4038 CR3: 0000000120a6f000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
queue_delayed_work_on+0xb4/0xc0
smb2_reconnect+0xb22/0xf50 [cifs]
smb2_reconnect_server+0x413/0xd40 [cifs]
? __pfx_smb2_reconnect_server+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? local_clock_noinstr+0xd/0xd0
? local_clock+0x15/0x30
? lock_release+0x29b/0x390
process_one_work+0x4c5/0xa10
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x37/0x120
worker_thread+0x2f1/0x5a0
? __kthread_parkme+0xde/0x100
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x1fe/0x380
? kthread+0x10f/0x380
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
? local_clock_noinstr+0xd/0xd0
? ret_from_fork+0x1b/0x1f0
? local_clock+0x15/0x30
? lock_release+0x29b/0x390
? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x15b/0x1f0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
irq event stamp: 1116206
hardirqs last enabled at (1116205): [<ffffffff8143af42>] __up_console_sem+0x52/0x60
hardirqs last disabled at (1116206): [<ffffffff81399f0e>] queue_delayed_work_on+0x6e/0xc0
softirqs last enabled at (1116138): [<ffffffffc04562fd>] __smb_send_rqst+0x42d/0x950 [cifs]
softirqs last disabled at (1116136): [<ffffffff823d35e1>] release_sock+0x21/0xf0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: drop fragments with multicast or broadcast RA
IEEE 802.11 fragmentation can only be applied to unicast frames.
Therefore, drop fragments with multicast or broadcast RA. This patch
addresses vulnerabilities such as CVE-2020-26145. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/bpf: fix JIT code size calculation of bpf trampoline
arch_bpf_trampoline_size() provides JIT size of the BPF trampoline
before the buffer for JIT'ing it is allocated. The total number of
instructions emitted for BPF trampoline JIT code depends on where
the final image is located. So, the size arrived at with the dummy
pass in arch_bpf_trampoline_size() can vary from the actual size
needed in arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(). When the instructions
accounted in arch_bpf_trampoline_size() is less than the number of
instructions emitted during the actual JIT compile of the trampoline,
the below warning is produced:
WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 204190 at arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:981 __arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline.isra.0+0xd2c/0xdcc
which is:
/* Make sure the trampoline generation logic doesn't overflow */
if (image && WARN_ON_ONCE(&image[ctx->idx] >
(u32 *)rw_image_end - BPF_INSN_SAFETY)) {
So, during the dummy pass, instead of providing some arbitrary image
location, account for maximum possible instructions if and when there
is a dependency with image location for JIT'ing. |
